The Existence of God - Part 3: Aquinas' Second Way

Let’s Review: Cause


In the previous post, we discussed that there are two kinds of series of causes and effects. An accidentally ordered series is a series temporally sequenced. An example might be to consider the case of a father begetting a son, who in turn begets another. If the father dies after begetting the son, the son can still beget a son of his own for once in existence the son has the power to do this all by himself. He doesn’t need his father to remain in existence for him to be able to sire a son. Imagine a long line of such fathers begetting sons who in turn beget sons of their own. In every case, the son has the power to beget a son of his own even if his father goes out of existence. Each member of the series, each “causer” of a son, is independent of the previous members of the series. This series is accidentally ordered in that it is not essential to the continuation of the series that any earlier member of it remain in existence. We observe such accidentally ordered series all around us. A cue ball rolls across the table striking a billiard ball causing it to roll across the tables as well. Or the example of the long line of dominoes used in the previous post. An accidentally ordered series of causes and effects is one in which the continuation of the series is independent of the existence and/or continued action of earlier members in the series.

Accidentally ordered series extend backwards in time, and theoretically can extend back forever. Because each member of such a series has its causal powers independently of the existence or action of previous members in the series, there is nothing about the actions of the members existing here and now that requires that we trace it back to some first member existing in the past. Even if there was a first cause of an accidentally ordered series, I cannot prove its existence here and now from the actions/changes in the current members of the series. In fact, the series would continue even if the first mover no longer existed, or existed only for a brief moment – just long enough to get the series going. Thus, there is no way to philosophically prove that such a series ever had a beginning or a first member.

An essentially ordered series of causes and effects is a series where each cause is simultaneous to each effect. Think of a hand which is pushing a stone by means of a stick. The motion of the stone only happens as long as the stick is moving it, and the stick is moving only as long as the hand is pushing it. At every moment in which the stone is moving, the stick is moving and the hand is pushing. The stone and the stick as well, only move because and insofar as the hand moves them. Strictly speaking, it is the hand alone which is doing the moving of the stone. The stick is merely an instrument by which the hand accomplishes this. This series is essentially ordered because the latter members in the series have no independent motion of their own and derive the fact of their motion and their ability to move from the first member in the series. Without the earlier members in the series, and specifically without the first member, the series would not continue.

Essentially ordered series do not extend backwards in time but rather “downward” in the present moment since they are series in which each member depends simultaneously on other members which simultaneously depend in turn on yet other members, and so on. In essentially ordered series, the latter members of the series have no independent causal power of their own but are mere instruments of a first member. If the last member in the series exists, e.g., the moving stone, the series cannot, even in theory, extend back infinitely. In an essentially ordered series, the actualization of one potential depends on the simultaneous actualization of another potential, which depends on the simultaneous actualization of another, which depends on the simultaneous actualization of another, which …. While the series may extend a long way, it cannot extend infinitely for an essentially ordered causal series exists here and now (not backwards in time) and by its very nature must have a first member. There must be a first member that provides the causal power being transmitted throughout the series.

Now in order for there not to be an infinite regress, there must be a first member. This first member must itself be unmoved and unchangeable. For if it was moving or changing, it would be going from potential to actual and there would need to be something outside it actualizing its potential in which case it would no longer be the first member.

In the first way, we see that Aquinas identifies this first member, the First Mover, as God.

To Be or Not To Be

In his second way of proving the existence of God, Aquinas begins with the simple observation that things exist. In order for a thing to change, it must exist. In order for the universe to undergo change, it obviously must exist. Specifically, it must continue in existence from moment to moment. So why does it do so? Why does anything keep existing? What keeps the universe going?

Before we get into the “meat” of Aquinas second way, let’s take a moment to provide some background.

The tree outside my window exists. It has being. Two principles explain its being, i.e., essence and existence. For the actually existing tree, indeed for any thing that actually exists in the world, both essence and existence are necessary. Essence and existence are distinct from each other. This distinction is real.

Essence is the “what” of a thing. It is the quiddity of the thing, that which is known about it by the forming of a concept. In this way it is a formal principle, because it is abstracted by the intellect. It is a universal principle making many material beings to be of the same kind (e.g., horses, animals, men, fish, rocks, etc.).

But essence, “what a thing is”, is completely distinct from a thing’s existing, “that it is”. The essence of a thing does not indicate anything about whether that thing actually exists. The essence of a horse that exists in the physical world and the essence of a horse that doesn’t (an imaginary horse) are the same – they both have “horse-ness”. A thing’s existing is totally different from what kind of a thing it is. Therefore there must be something about really existing things that accounts for this. This is their existence. Existence then is that which makes essences “to be”, to exercise the act of existing. Aquinas identified the act of existing with the Latin term “esse”, to be.

The relationship of essence and esse is likened by analogy to that relationship between form and matter. Form determines and actualizes some part of matter. Similarly, esse actualizes the potency of a thing’s essence. This similarity is only analogous. Form can be separated from matter by abstraction. However, the esse and essence of a thing are not separable in real beings. Esse is logically prior to all other actuality because a thing cannot be in a certain way unless it first simply “is”. Because of this logical priority of existence, Aquinas calls esse “the most formal of all.” “It is the actuality of all acts” since a thing “is” in virtue of esse (existence) and “acts are of supposits” of what “is”.

The Second Way – Argument from Existence

Aquinas bases his second way of proving God’s existence on the observable fact that the universe does indeed exist.

“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”

As mentioned above, the question that Aquinas is posing is not whether the Universe has a beginning or not. He is not asking a question about what got things started or even about how long the Universe has been in existence. Rather taking the observable fact that the universe exists in such a way that its existence persists from one moment to the next, why does it do so? What keeps the universe going? What keeps the universe in existence?

Is there something in the natures of the physical things that exist in the universe that allows them to persist? The answer is quite simply no. Consider the nature or essence of any thing in the physical universe. Consider the essence of a human being. For argument’s sake, let’s agree with Aristotle that the essence of a human being is to be a rational animal. Does knowing that tell us anything about whether people really exist? Does it tell you whether Barak Obama, Aristotle, or Clark Kent exists? We know Barak Obama exists because we have seen him on television or met him in person. Aristotle doesn’t exist anymore. Clark Kent never existed outside the Superman comics and movies. So there is nothing about the essence of a thing that entails whether or not the thing really exists.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

As described above, the essence of a thing and the existence of a thing are distinct. There is nothing in the essence that necessitates existence. Something then needs to put essence and existence together for a thing to be real. That “something” cannot be the thing itself for to give itself existence a thing would have to exist already. So nothing can cause itself. Whatever comes into existence – whatever must have existence added to its essence in order for it to be real must be caused by another.

Aquinas is not saying that everything must have a cause. What is being said is that only what does not have existence on its own must have a cause, and since it cannot have existence on its own, this cause must be something other than itself.

To recap then, the essence of everything in the physical universe is distinct from its existence. Each of these things must be caused by something outside itself. From this, it becomes clear that the universe as a whole must have a cause outside itself.

As in the case of change, here we can identify two kinds of causal series: accidentally ordered and essentially ordered. Remember that accidentally ordered series are temporally sequenced, extending back in time. But again, Aquinas is not concerned with what events in the past led to what exists in the here and now. Rather, Aquinas is asking what is it that is keeping the things that exist, here and now, in existence here and now. What is sustaining the existence here and now?

Let’s return to an example we used above – the example of fathers begetting sons. Your father beget you but he is not what is sustaining you in being here and now. Remember that this represents an accidentally ordered series – your existence here and now is independent of your father’s existence or non-existence here and now. My own father died 18 years ago. Yet, I still exist.

No, what’s sustaining your existence is something like the current state of the cells of your body, which in turn are sustained by what’s going on at the molecular level, and the atomic level, along with gravitation, the weak and strong forces, and so forth – all of which whose essence is distinct from their existence and thus need a cause outside themselves. In short, we have another essentially ordered causal series which as we previously showed must end in a first cause.

In fact considering the universe as a whole, its elements, down to the smallest detail, consists of elements whose essence is distinct from their existence and thus cannot account for their own being from moment to moment. The universe as a whole must be sustained in being here and now by a cause outside itself, a First Cause, which simultaneously upholds the entire series.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause

This First Cause cannot itself be composed of essence and existence. For if it had both essence and existence, it would require something outside of itself to explain its own existence and thus would no longer be a first cause. The essence/existence distinction does not apply then to the First Cause. Rather the First Cause is pure existence, pure being – not a being, strictly speaking, but Being Itself, fully actualized.

Aquinas upon demonstrating the necessity of the First Cause further describes it as that “ to which everyone gives the name of God”.

The Existence of God - Part 2: Aquinas' First Way

Aquinas states that the existence of God can be proven by reason.  Although a Christian, he argues that the individual can arrive at knowledge of God’s existence without recourse to the Christian Scriptures but through the use of reason, logical demonstration.  He offers five ways to prove the existence of God through the use of reason.  The first way, an argument from change, he argues is the most obvious.

Aquinas writes, “The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion.  Aquinas following from Aristotle uses the term “motion” to refer to any change.  He continues by stating that “it is certain and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion”.  It is a clear and obvious fact of the world that things can change.

He goes on to explain that every change has a cause.  Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.

When something changes, it acquires a new characteristic.  A thing cannot change unless it has a potential to acquire the new characteristic and it does not already have that characteristic.  In any change, the thing undergoing the change must have the capacity or potentiality to be what it will become, and yet not actually be that which it will become.

In this demonstration, Aquinas uses two examples of change:  wood catching fire and a hand moving a staff.  For wood to catch fire, it must not actually be burning but must be capable of burning.  Wood catching fire involves the reduction of the wood’s potentiality of wood to burn to the actuality of it burning.  It must pass from the potential to catch fire to actually being on fire.  Wood that is not burning has the potential to catch fire.  Wood that is on fire no longer has the potential to catch fire because it is actually on fire.

But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.  Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

The cause of change must be something other than the thing changing.  A change brings about a new actuality, e.g., wood on fire, from what was first potential to this new actuality, e.g., wood not on fire but capable of being on fire.  So the new actuality (burning wood) cannot be the actuality that brings itself to be (wood already on fire cannot set itself on fire).  The cause precedes the effect, and therefore the effect cannot be its own cause.  A burning match cannot ignite itself.  Anything that is changing is being caused to change by something else.

The example of burning wood is an example of a temporal causal series.  The heating of the wood precedes in time the wood catching fire.  Another example might help.  Think of a long line of dominoes, each standing on end with a domino in front of it and behind it.  If I push over the first domino in this line, it will knock over the next domino.  The second domino will knock over the third and so on.  Each domino will knock over the next in sequence.  Now once I push over the first domino, my job is done.  I can simply walk away and the sequence will run its course without me.  Likewise any domino in the sequence could suddenly disappear after it pushed the next domino and the sequence would continue.  Each cause precedes each effect in time, but each effect must and does have a cause.  In fact, the line of dominos could stretch into infinity in either direction and the principle of “every change has a cause” would still hold true.  

Aristotle argued that the universe, the world, was eternal , with no beginning or end.  In this demonstration, Aquinas does not refute this even though as a Christian he believed that the world had a definite beginning point.  This demonstration is not about a beginning point, a moment of creation, for the world, but is about the fact that every change requires a cause outside of the thing that is changing and that this fact leads logically to the conclusion that God exists. 

But if one cannot arrive at God from a temporal series of causes, how can His existence be shown?  The answer comes in the next part of the demonstration.  Now that Aquinas has established the truth of every change needing a cause, he narrows his argument to a specific type of cause.

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again.  Here he considers only the case where the cause of a change is itself a process of change or motion.  He gives an example of such a case by citing a hand moving a staff.
In the example of a hand moving a staff, we do not have a temporal sequence of causes.  The hand does not initiate the staff’s movement as in the case of the dominoes.  No, the staff will move only as long as the hand moves it.  The cause of the change, i.e., the hand moving, is simultaneous to the change it effects, i.e., the movement of the staff, and continues and sustains the movement throughout the process.  Aquinas calls these kinds of causes (that act simultaneously to the process of change they effect) as per se causes.  Their effects are essentially subordinated to the causes, not temporally successive.

But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.

The staff moves because the hand moves.  The effect is the result of a simultaneous motion/change of a prior cause.  This motion/change of the cause must itself be the result of a simultaneous motion/change in another prior cause, and so on.  It is tempting to think that such essentially subordinated series of causes could stretch out infinitely, just as a temporally successive series of causes could.  But this is quite impossible, because we are talking about causes that are simultaneous in time to the effects.  There must be something driving the motion/change of the entire system.  As an example think of a long line of train cars, each connected to the one in front and behind.  This long line of cars is moving steadily along the track through Western Oklahoma.  Each car is transferring motion or energy to the other car in line and so on.  There must be at some point a locomotive for the train.  The locomotive is the initiator of the motion.  If the line of cars was infinitely long, there would be no first cause to originate the motion or energy being transferred simultaneously down the line of cars.  The point here is simple and logically obvious.  In an essentially subordinated series (series of simultaneous causes) the only cause really changing anything is the first cause in the series.

Aquinas then takes the argument to its logical conclusion.

Whenever the effects are the result of the simultaneous motion of prior causes that are themselves effects of prior moving causes, there must be something driving the motion of the system.  For example, a series of train cars which is transferring motion cannot be infinitely long because there would be no motion or energy to transfer without a first cause and source for the motion supposedly being transferred.  There must at some point be a locomotive for the train.  The point is simple and logically obvious.  In an essentially subordinated series (series of simultaneous causes) the only cause that is really changing anything is the first cause in the series.

Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other

This first mover must be fully actualized, i.e., unchanging, because anything that changes requires a cause for that change.  A “first cause” that itself was subject to change could not in fact be the first cause because the fact of it changing requires that something else outside the “first mover” cause the change.  Similarly, the first mover cannot be a physical, material being.  All physical, material beings are subject to motion/change.  The first mover is un-changing.  Therefore, the first mover cannot be a physical, material being.

Aquinas then ends the demonstration with a simple statement.

and this everyone understands to be God.

At this point, it is important to point out some important points about this first way.  Aquinas never says that everything changes.  He points out that change is an observed reality in the world.

He does not argue that the First Mover is the Creator of the Universe in this demonstration.  Nor does he argue that every change leads to the conclusion that a First Mover exists.  Nor does he argue in this demonstration that all the changes in the Universe demonstrate the existence of a First Mover.

He very specifically argues that an essentially subordinated series (series of simultaneous causes) demonstrates the existence of a First Mover.  His argument holds even if we can identify only one such case.

He never states the First Mover verifies or captures all the characteristics and beliefs about the Christian God contained in the Bible.  This demonstration did not have as its purpose to fully describe or prove the nature of God as contained in Christian belief.

To summarize the argument:

1. Things can change/move.
2. Every change is caused by the activity of something else - Nothing is the cause of its own process of change
3. If the activity of the cause is itself a change or motion then this per se effect must be caused by another prior, simultaneous cause.
4. In a chain of per se or essentially subordinated causes, there would be no last effect if something were not driving the whole chain as the first cause.  Since there must be a first initiator of change in essentially subordinated causes, the chain cannot be infinite.
5. Therefore there must be a First Mover that acts and causes change, but whose causing activity is not a change or motion.
6. This First Mover must be non-physical, non-changing but an actual and active cause of change/motion.

This First Mover is identified as God.

The Existence of God - Part 1

Change Happens


When we observe the world around us, two fundamental observations can be made. First, it is clear that things exist. Second, it is clear that things can change. I’m not saying that things necessarily have to change but I think it is very clear that some things change sometimes.

The most basic principle in philosophy is that “nothing can come from nothing”. Its corollary is that “something cannot be and not-be at the same time”. Both are very common sensical statements. The table I am sitting at either “is” or “isn’t”. Likewise, I don’t expect coffee to suddenly appear in my empty coffee cup. Nothing is a complete absence of something. Since there is no something in nothing, something cannot suddenly appear from nothing. So, there is either being or non-being.

Now change means that something new comes to be while something old ceases to be. But if nothing comes from nothing, how can something new come to be when it didn’t exist before?

Likewise, how can some new being come to exist from something already in existence? It would seem that no new being can come from another being, since what has being already is and does not begin to be.

You may think these questions to be somewhat silly, but they represent a truly profound problem when trying to explain change. Any explanation of change must address these issues. Parmenides, a Greek philosopher living before Aristotle, arrived at the conclusion that change is impossible and that the change we observe is illusion.

Thankfully, Aristotle solved the dilemma. He agreed with the truth of the statement that “nothing can come from nothing”. However, it is not entirely true that “being cannot come from being”. Aristotle distinguished “being-in-act” from “being-in-potency”. It is true that being-in-act cannot come from being-in-act because it already is fully actualized. However being-in-act can arise from being-in-potency.

As an example, let us consider a sculptor creating a statue. He can carve the statue from a block of marble. This is possible because the block of marble has the “potential” to be shaped into the statue – it has the possibility and capacity for being transformed. The figure of the statue is in potency within the block of marble. This potency is not nothing. It is real – not in the same as the reality of being-in-act, but with the reality of being-in-potency.

Every change implies a duality. A subject in potency, by the action of some agent, passes into actuality. Change presupposes the acquisition of something and the corruption of something else. The subject of change is what stays the same throughout the change. However, through the change, it acquires something new and loses what it previously had. Change implies a passive principle and an active principle intrinsic to the thing that changes.

Thus there are three principles necessary to any change. Something new comes to be (form). Something old passes away (privation). Something stays the same throughout (matter). In the example of the statue, the form, what comes to be, is the shape of the sculptured statue. The privation, what passes away, is the formlessness of the block of marble and the potential for the statue shape. The matter, what stays the same throughout the change, is the marble. This example is an example of an accidental change – what changes are the accidents of the marble, but the substance of the marble stays the same throughout.

There are three kinds of accidental change: change in quality (alteration), change in quantity/size (growth or diminuition), and change in place (local motion). In all cases, change can be defined as the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency. Change is the process by which a substance loses one accidental form or actuality and gains another. Change is the act of something that does not yet have, but is acquiring, the full act of a new accidental determination, a new quality, size or position. While the change is happening, the new determination is neither fully actual (because then the change would be over) nor fully potential (for then the change would not have started). In this way, any change is an imperfect act. The implication of this is that there must be a cause sustaining the change as it is occurring.

What we have discussed about accidental change can also apply to substantial change, a passing away and coming to be of substances. For example, iron, a metal, is a different substance from oxygen, a gas. When combined, they form a third substance, rust, that is very different from either iron or oxygen. This is a substantial change. The principles of change described above apply here as well. What comes to be is the form rust. This form comes to be in the matter of iron and oxygen. However, form and matter compose a substantial unity. Form cannot exist without matter nor matter without some form.

But form means much more than a simple arrangement of atoms or molecules. While it is true that form cannot exist without matter, and in a sense, form is realized in matter in a certain configuration, the matter does not all by itself account for its configuration. Form is a cause in the sense that it is constitutive of the thing it Is the form of, just as matter is constitutive of the thing. But form has a certain priority and explanatory value because the form accounts for the matter being in a certain configuration while in that configuration, something matter cannot do. For example, a house can be made of bricks, but the bricks by themselves do not account for the house as opposed to a pile of bricks.

A change in something must have a cause. The change that something undergoes cannot be the cause of that very same process of change. The change results in a new actuality. This new actuality is a result of what is first potential to it. Therefore the resulting actuality cannot be the actuality that brings itself about. Anything changing is being made to change by some other actuating cause, and this actuating cause is an actuality prior to the change which is the effect.

In speaking of causation, we can differentiate two kinds. The prior actuality, the cause, of a change may be prior in time. Example: A cue ball rolls across the pool table and strikes another billiard ball causing the ball to begin rolling. Once the cue ball has initiated the motion of the billiard ball, the cue ball has no further part to play in the continuation or culmination of the change. In fact if the cue ball were to instantly disappear immediately after striking the billiard ball, the motion of the billiard ball would play out in the same way as if the cue ball were still present.

However, some causes of change act simultaneously with the changes they effect. Examples: a hand moving a staff; a series of interlocking gears; or a series of train cars being pulled by a locomotive engine; any system of simultaneous transfer of change or motion with net energy output. In such cases, the change is sustained only by the continued presence of the cause. If the cause is removed, the change could not occur. If the hand is removed, the staff would no longer move.

Aquinas and the Proofs of God’s Existence

Aquinas deals with the question of God’s existence in Question 2 of the First Part of his masterpiece, the Summa Theologiae. The Summa is divided into large sections called Parts. Each part is divided into questions. These questions are more like topics rather than specific questions. Each question then is divided into articles. Each article is a specific question, e.g., “Whether the existence of God is self-evident?” In responding to each article, Aquinas first lays out objections (arguments counter to his own) to the question. Next, Aquinas lays out his answer to the question, and then specifically addresses and refutes each objection.

Question 2 entails three articles. Article 1 asks, “Whether the existence of God is self-evident?” Aquinas concludes that the existence of God is not self-evident to humans. If God’s existence were self-evident, then no one would be an atheist.

Article 2 asks, “Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?” Aquinas reminds us that there are two kinds of demonstration. A priori demonstration argues from the cause to its effect. A posteriori demonstration argues from an observed effect to its cause. Since God’s existence is not self-evident, God’s existence cannot be demonstrated a priori, for the cause, in this case God, is not self-evident. However, God’s existence can be demonstrated a posteriori, by arguing from His effects observed in the world.

Article 3 asks, “Whether God exists?” Aquinas concludes that God’s existence can be proved in five ways. We will address each of these five ways in separate posts.

However before addressing Aquinas’ first way, it is interesting to note the objections to the existence of God. Aquinas details just two objections to God’s existence. But these are, and have been historically, the strongest arguments against God’s existence.

The first objection noted arises from the existence of evil.

Aquinas writes, “It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. “

The second objection is the quite modern argument from the power of science to explain the world.

Aquinas states, “Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. “

It is very interesting to remember that Aquinas was writing in the 13th century. So it is clear that the “new atheism” is hardly new. If anything the arguments it puts forward in defense of itself are simple derivatives and corollaries to these very old objections. That’s not to discount the strength of these arguments. Nor is it to diminish the importance of addressing them head on. We will address each of these objections in its own right following the discussions of the five ways.

Philosophy 101B

It’s the nature of the thing!


The most direct way for me to know something is to experience it with my senses – to taste it, feel it, see it, hear it, or smell it. Indeed all human knowledge begins with the senses. I know, have direct sensory experience, that there are many things that exist in the world, trees, cars, bicycles, children, adults, dogs, etc. I am also certain that each of these things in the world are different from me, i.e., I am not the tree and the tree is not me. This seems to be a very basic experience, and one would assume that this is probably a good candidate for the simplest, most direct knowledge. But if we take a moment to really think about this we will see that the understanding that I am not the tree is not the most basic knowledge we have. Indeed, knowing the tree is not the most basic, nor is knowing that that thing is a tree. No, the most fundamental knowledge we have is existence itself. The first thing that I can say with certainty about the tree is not that it is a thing called a “tree” – but that it is a thing – it “is”. It is only after I know that that thing exists that I can judge it to be a tree.

From this primary experience of existence, the intellect begins to form concepts leading to the differentiation among all the things found in the natural world. In experiencing the natural world, it becomes clear that the things in the world come into being and run their course without benefit of my assistance or influence. In other words, I am not the tree and the tree is not me. Furthermore, each thing in the world has its own “nature”, the source of the activities the thing originates. This “nature” is unique to each thing. Examples of things with natures are rocks, plants, animals, chemical elements and their compounds, planets, stars, galaxies. All of these things come into existence and pass away. All these things change and are changeable.

To say that something is a rose or a cow is to describe its nature. The intellect grasps the nature of a thing from its appearance and from the way it acts/reacts in various situations. When the nature of a thing is defined, I am able to differentiate it from other things. Thus, natures are universals, concepts, objects of the intellect.

The nature of a thing makes the thing be what it is, serves to differentiate it from all other things, and accounts for its unique activities and responses. I initially grasp natures in a general way as I learn language and attach meanings to words. My understanding is further refined as I gain more information and experience about the objects I know. My understanding of an object’s nature grows with more experience with the object. Thus, a gardener would know more about roses than a child. But both would share a general understanding of the nature of a rose.

Change, Motion, and Cause

As alluded to earlier, things move, that is things change. Things exist. Things change. But for a thing to change, there must be a cause. Oftentimes, these causes remain hidden from my direct sensory observation, but I can learn something about the cause from its effect, the change I do observe.

Four factors can be identified as the causes of change. They do not all operate in the same way but each functions in a unique, distinctive manner. The four factors are usually identified as matter, form, agent, and end. Matter becomes the material cause, form the formal cause, agent the efficient cause, and end the final cause.

An example might help in understanding this. In analyzing a table, the matter and form become very evident. Matter is the “stuff” out of which the table is made and which remains in it. Let’s say that our table is made of maple wood. The form is the shape or design imposed on the matter – in this case the shape of the table formed during its making. Both matter and form are internal to the table that is they are within it not external to it. Matter and form explain why the table is what it is. Matter and form, then, are internal causes.

Agent and end are external causes. Agent and end are external to the table and explain “how” the table came to be. The agent is the carpenter who made the table from the raw materials. The end is the objective or goal that the carpenter had in mind when making the table – say to make an elegant dining table. Both agent and end are not found within the table but are external to it. If the table embodies the goal the carpenter had in mind completely, it is called a good table.

To summarize: The agent acts on matter to enduce the form from it as the end of the process.

From the example I provided above the interactions of the four causes are fairly easy to understand. However, it can be more difficult to see these four causes at work in the things of nature, apart from the influence of human actions. The table is an artifact, a product of human action. Natural entities are substances that have natures that explain their unique activities. For each natural thing, I want to explore the matter from which it is formed, how its form is different from an artifact, the agency that produces it, and the end intended and achieved through nature’s processes.

What’s the matter?

Matter is the “stuff” out of which a thing is made and remains in it. So what is matter? The maple that from which the table is made is rather obvious. But what about the maple tree? Or what about gold, or water, or a cow? The question becomes: is there a basic “stuff” out of which all natural substances are made and that remains in them?

This has been the $64,000 question for almost 3000 years now. There have been several proposed answers – earth, air, water, fire and ether were the standard answer until the 18th century.

In the 19th century, science discovered the chemical elements which seemed to give the answer to the question about the basic stuff. But what is the stuff from which the elements are made? Atoms. What composes atoms? Protons, neutrons, and electrons. What composes these particles? Etc. etc. Modern science still is probing what this most fundamental matter could be. The most successful factor based on the work of Einstein is the concept of mass-energy.

Aristotle termed this most fundamental stuff as prime matter or protomatter. This prime matter is the basic potential principle underlying all changes in the universe. Matter is not passive and inert but is a potency, a potentiality, at the foundation of all change that occurs throughout the universe. Prime matter is conserved in any and all changes (e.g., matter-energy is neither created nor destroyed).

Form

Form is the shape or figure the matter assumes in a thing. As such, form becomes part of its being. In our table example, the form is the shape the maple wood assumes when the table is made. The form then is part of the table’s being. Although the maple wood was not always formed as a table, as long as it was identifiable as maple is was under some form.

Matter and form then are inseparable. But although matter is somewhat unintelligible, form allows us to understand the natures of things in the world.

Form allows me to identify things, animals, plants, and minerals with which I come in contact. Form allows me to classify things according to differences among them. Even though individual objects within a class have differences among them, I can still understand them as a class and ascribe a common nature to them. For example, I understand the concept of animals even though a dog is very different than an eagle. It is this form or formality that I name and define as I learn about the natural kinds of things in the world.

Size, shape, quantity, quality, color etc. are accidents that exist in the substance of a thing. These are changeable. I can change the size or shape of the table without changing the substance of which it is composed. The form that underlies these accidental attributes, that makes it an enduring substance, is called the substantial form or natural form. Changing attributes and properties are accidental forms. These are forms that modify the substance in various ways. Accidental forms may vary in degree, or in presence and absence, without affecting the basic character of the substance.

It is the natural or substantial form that I apprehend when I understand the nature of something and attempt to define it. The substantial form is a universal concept that is given in the sense world but results from intellectual abstraction – the first order of abstraction. Once grasped, I can apply the universal concept of the nature of things to individual examples of those things. Thus, I can have universal knowledge of the natural world

Philosophy 101A

In this discussion, appeal will be made to the following three guides:


1. The basic assumptions listed earlier in this blog,

The natural world exists

The natural world exists independent of our minds.

The natural world is orderly.

The order of the natural world is contingent.

Humans are able to know this natural contingent order.

2. Philosophical Common sense or Common Sense Philosophy

Common sense refers to the spontaneous activity of the intellect, the way in which it operates of its own native vigor before it has been given any special training. It implies man's native capacity to know the most fundamental aspects of reality

Philosophy is linked to common sense in that both concern themselves with the most fundamental aspects of reality. In particular, philosophy concerns itself with the existence of things (including our own existence), the first principles of being (identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle), and secondary principles which flow immediately from the self-evident principles (causality, sufficient reason, etc.).

While common sense utilizes these principles, it does so unconsciously, unreflectively, and uncritically. Faulty education, cultural prejudice, deceptive sense imagery can distort and obscure common sense. Philosophy seeks to use these principles critically, consciously, scientifically (i.e., intellectually, rationally, and through causes); and thus can defend and communicate its knowledge.

Another link between common sense and philosophy is that they both take in (seek to know) all of reality. Saying that philosophy knows the totality of reality does not mean that any one philosopher can claim omniscience. Rather, it refers to the fact that all of reality is the subject matter of the philosopher’s inquiry because he takes as his point of view the highest and first principles, the ultimate causes, of all reality. Philosophy, as well as common sense, seeks to develop a comprehensive, all encompassing view of reality – in short, the knowledge of all things.

True philosophy, then, grows out of common sense. Any philosophy, therefore, that strays very far from common sense is suspect. If it goes so far as to contradict the basic certitudes of common sense, then it is guilty of denying reality itself, and on this point common sense can pass judgment on it.

Philosophy is a tool to help us move from the realm of human experience – things we can feel and touch, see, taste and smell – towards reaching what is objectively true. Philosophical inquiry does not leave the enquirer confused and lost in ideas but marks the first step in clearly reaching an understanding of life and its meaning.

3. Logic

Logic is the tool, the means by which we are able to “do” philosophy (or science for that matter). With this tool in hand, we are able to attain certain and irrefutable knowledge through clear, logical reasoning.



Knowledge – How I Know Things

In common language, knowledge refers to anything that I take as certain no matter how I arrived at that certainty.

So how do I come to know things? How do I come to know with certainty?

There are basically three categories of knowledge: sense knowledge, intellectual knowledge, and belief (faith).

1. Sense Knowledge

The most direct knowledge of the world comes to me from my senses or from sense experience. The most direct way for me to know something is to experience it with my senses – to taste it, feel it, see it, hear it, or smell it. Indeed all human knowledge begins with the senses. I know, have direct sensory experience, that there are many things that exist in the world, trees, cars, bicycles, children, adults, dogs, etc. This type of knowledge is the most obvious.

This sense knowledge is attained in two stages. First, my sense organs (eye, ear, nose, mouth, and skin) – my outer senses – when stimulated - produce a sensation characteristic of a particular sense (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch).

The sensation then is passed to my inner senses. These inner senses are located within my brain and nervous system. For simplicity sake, these can be divided into three components, the central sense, the imagination, and the memory. The central sense receives sensations and integrates them into a singular composite representation called a percept through a process called perception.

For example in sense experience I perceive a rose. This is an individual large, deep red rose with a very sweet pleasant fragrance, a long green stem with very long pointed and sharp thorns. All these sensations and possibly others are incorporated into the single percept whereby I perceive this particular rose.

With imagination, I can reconstitute the elements that entered into the percept of the rose, and in its absence, I can imagine the rose. I can imagine it as it actually was or I can imagine it in an embellished way, for example as a yellow rose. I can remember the rose as it was in the past utilizing memory to recall the particular percept. In this way, I build up sense experience by accumulating memory of all the percepts I have experienced in my lifetime.

2.   Intellectual Knowledge

This large database then is drawn upon by my intellect. I am capable of acquiring a deeper knowledge through my mind or intellect. My mind enables me to transcend the knowledge of the individual things (trees, cars, bicycles, children, adults, dogs, etc.) provided to me by my senses. My intellect is capable of grasping the natures of things as they are in themselves, through universals. Universals are less obvious to us, but with them I am able to go beyond the surface appearances of things as presented by my senses.

In effect, my intellect works on my sense experience by focusing on the percept and extracting various intelligible aspects of it creating a universal concept. This is accomplished in two stages. First the intellect illuminates the percept in a particular way. Then under this illumination, it abstracts intelligible content from the percept. The percept is a concrete and singular image of a thing perceived (the rose). The concept is an abstract and universal representation that furnishes me with an idea of what I perceived (rose-ness). The concept is abstract because it was abstracted from the particulars of my sense knowledge. It is universal because it grasps the nature of the particular – what it means to be a rose. I am able then to apply the concept to all objects that I perceive share the same nature as the rose. The concept then is a universal idea or meaning. In this way, I build up many concepts in my mind.

Types of Concepts

The concepts developed as described above are said to be natural concepts because they arise from sense knowledge of nature. These concepts can be understood simply on the basis of ordinary experience of the world.

Such concepts can be classified in terms of the two intellectual processes by which they are formed, illumination and abstraction. Abstraction can provide various degrees of abstractness depending on how the precept is illuminated by the intellect. Generally, three orders of abstraction can be delineated providing us with three basic types of concepts: natural concepts, mathematical concepts, and metaphysical concepts.

Natural Concepts

Consider the precept “this rose”.

Natural concepts are associated with the first order of abstraction in which the intellect leaves aside the individual and concrete aspects of the precept, the “this”. In this way I come to the universal of “rose”. I am no longer tied to a particular, unique rose, but the natural concept of “rose”, the blossom of any and every rose bush. I grasp the meaning that is common to all classes of objects that share the properties of “rose”. The natural concept refers to objects that exist in matter as it is perceived by our senses, what we call sensible matter. One of the characteristics of such matter is that it is always capable of undergoing change.

Mathematical Concepts

Associated with the second order of abstraction, mathematical concepts are more abstract due to the fact that more is left aside when they are conceptualized. Consider the precepts “three roses” and “wooden ball” and the concepts of “three” and “sphere” that may be abstracted from them. “Three” and “sphere” are both mathematical concepts referring to all classes of things that share the number “three” and geometrical shape “sphere”. These concepts do not reference anything sensible. The “three” does not contain any reference to roses but merely indicates a group of units that are only imaginable. “Sphere” does not refer to an object being composed of wood, metal, or plastic. Rather, it indicates a body composed of continuous quantity, an imaginable or intelligible matter that does not exhibit any sensible qualities.

Metaphysical Concepts

Metaphysical concepts are the most abstract of all for they are separated entirely from matter and contain no reference to individual, sensible, or intelligible matter. Examples of metaphysical concepts are “being” and “existent”. The concept of “being” expresses an intelligible content that is found in roses, balls, and mathematical objects. All of these are beings in some sense. Metaphysical concepts are very general and apply to being as such, not just to objects in sensible matter (changeable being) or intelligible matter (quantified being). Metaphysical concepts apply to whatever “is” including things that are completely immaterial, incorporeal, or spiritual (for example, the concept of God – assuming such things do indeed exist - but we will get to that in a later post).

Natural concepts, mathematical concepts, and metaphysical concepts are all concepts drawn from the real world by various degrees of abstraction and so are termed real concepts. Real concepts are formed in the intellect, but they are concepts of things that exist outside the intellect and they enable me to grasp the natures of such things.

Logical Concepts

But I also have concepts of concepts. These logical concepts are completely existent in my mind. They have no independent existence outside my mind.

Grammatical concepts are logical concepts. Consider I have the concepts of “rose” and “red”. From these, I can formulate a proposition or sentence, “The rose is red”. Further, I can formulate two more sentences from this one: “Rose is the subject” and “Red is the predicate”. In so doing, I have developed two more concepts: “subject” and “predicate” – which reveal how “rose” and “red” relate to each other in the sentence “The rose is red”. “Rose” and “redness” exist outside my mind but “subject” and “predicate” do not.

Logical concepts are universals of a special kind, the most important of which are of two types: predicables and categories. Predicables are referred to as modes of predication (assignment of something to a class), whereas categories are referred to as modes of being (how something “is”).

Predicables

There are five predicables: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. While genus and species share a common name to taxonomic classifications used in modern biology, they should not be confused with them.

Genus describes many things that differ in species. Genus answers the question “what is it?” For example, humans, butterflies, and starfish are said to be of the same genus since they all fall under the category of “animal”.

Species is the universal of many things that differ only in number again in answer to the question “what is it?”. Einstein and Aristotle belong to the species “human” because they share in human nature, common to all individuals in the species “human”.

Differentia is the qualitative part of the nature of things that differ in number and also species. Man is rational for rationality is what distinguishes humans from all the other species of “animals”.

Property is the universal said of a species as belonging exclusively, necessarily, and always to a species and its individuals. An example would be "scientifically teachable," since only humans are capable of learning a science or other intellectual discipline.

Accident is the universal said of a species as belonging contingently to the species and its individuals. “White” as said of humans is a predicable accident since it does not pertain to the essence of being human to be white.

Universality is found more properly in essential predicates than in those that do not indicate the essence of the subject. Of the essential predicates, the genus is more universal than the species, and so these predicates are given first as substantial predicates. After them comes differentia as a qualitative predicate. And finally we have property and accident as predicates that are yet more distant from the essence of the subjects to which they are being attributed.

Categories

The ten basic categories designate modes of being. The first is substance, and other nine are quantity, quality, relation, location, time, disposition (the arrangement of parts), rainment (being clothed, armed, etc.), action, and passion. These are the basic or ultimate groups into which real entities may be classified.

Substance is unique in that it exists in itself, does not exist in another, and cannot be said of another. Accidents exist in another and cannot exist in themselves but must exist in a substance. Substance then sustains accidents in their being. Accidents are the modifications that substances undergo, but that do not change the kind of thing that each substance is. Accidents only exist when they are the accidents of some substance.

These categories reflect the basic distinction in the way reality is stuctured and reflect the basic way that I view reality. The fundamental distinction is between substance and accident. Substance is whatever is a natural kind of thing and exists in its own right. Examples are rocks, trees, animals, etc. What an animal is, a dog for example, is basically the same whether it is black or brown, here or there, etc. A dog is a substance since it exists in its own right; it does not exist in something else, the way a color does.

All these distinctions are basically logical, but in a sense they reflect the structure of reality. I never find any substance that I experience without some accidents, nor an accident that is not the accident of a substance. Every dog, for instance, has some color, place, size. Nevertheless, it is obvious that what a dog is is not the same as its color, or its size, etc

Scientific Reasoning (in Philosophy)

In philosophy, scientific reasoning, in its strictest sense, means reasoning that leads to certain and irrefutable knowledge of the causes of things in the world. The process involved is demonstration which depends on a special type of syllogism termed demonstrative regress.

Causes, by definition, are followed by their effects. A cause is prior and the effect is posterior. In my search for knowledge, I can begin with a cause and reason to its effect. This is a priori reasoning.

Often though, I am only able to observe effects in the world, the causes of which are hidden or unclear to me. In these cases, I can begin with the effects and reason my way to their causes. This is a posteriori reasoning. To be certain, however, I would need then to later reverse the procedure and reason a priori back to the effects.

This twofold reasoning process is called demonstrative regression. The first a posteriori stage, moving from effect to cause, individual to universal, is the process of induction. Induction is the primary reasoning method of modern science. Deduction is the second a priori stage in which I move from the cause back to the effect in order to explain the effect from its cause.

Induction, a posteriori reasoning, usually begins with observations made about the world. It begins with individual, singular objects/events perceived by the senses. It concludes with the discovery of causes or explanatory principles for the effects observed. These causes or principles are universals grasped by my intellect. The second process, deduction, uses the causes or principles, the universals, to return to the observations which I now recognize as effects. I understand them in terms of the factors that make them what they are.

I accomplish this demonstrative regression through the work of my intellect. Let’s see how this is accomplished using an example.

I observe that the moon exhibits phases. Through inductive reasoning, I arrive at a possible cause for this. I can express this in a statement or proposition. The moon exhibits phases because it is a sphere.

Restating and identifying the grammatical components I arrive at:

The moon (Subject) exhibits phases (Predicate) because it is a sphere (Middle term).

I can now write the proposition in the form of a syllogism.



A sphere (M) exhibits phases (P).
M is P

The moon (S) is a sphere (M).
S is M

Therefore, the moon (S) exhibits phases (P).
S is P

This is an a posteriori argument and a demonstration. Now, I can turn the demonstration into an a priori demonstration by interchanging its middle term and predicate. This gives us the following:



A body that exhibits phases (M) is a sphere (P).
M is P

The moon (S) exhibits phases (M).
S is M

Therefore, the moon (S) is a sphere (P).
S is P



If both the a posteriori and a priori demonstrations are logically consistent, valid, and true, then I have shown that indeed the moon exhibits phases because it is a sphere, and I have certainty of this knowledge.

True?

The Universe

 

A large hackberry tree grows outside the front window of my house. I see it everytime I walk through the living room. The tree and my relationship to it provide a good starting point for our discussions.

 

In considering the universe, several basic principles become obvious. I cannot necessarily “prove” the truth of these principles but my common experience of the universe, and that of my friends and colleagues, confirm their truth. These principles then are self-evident – they can be considered some of the first principles upon which I build my knowledge and understanding of the universe – they are part of the common sense. What are these?

 

1. Things exist. The tree in my yard exists.
2. The things of the universe exist outside my mind. The tree exists outside my mind. It is not a figment of my imagination, nor is it dependent on my thoughts about it. Its existence is separate from mine. I am not the tree, and the tree is not me.
3. The universe is orderly. The tree is subject to orderly patterns of growth and development, common to other trees. Furthermore, the internal workings of the cells and tissues of the tree exhibit characteristic patterns and order of operation – again common to other trees. There is a lawful order and pattern to the universe and its operations.
4. I can understand the order found in the universe.
5. The universe is contingent. Things come into existence and seemingly go out of existence. But no thing causes its own existence. The tree in my yard to not cause itself to exist. It came from a seed that was produced by another tree. Something does not come from nothing, and a thing cannot exist and not exist at the same time.
6. Likewise, things in the universe change. People grow older, fatter, thinner, balder. Grass grows and gets cut. Erosion wears down mountains and volcanic eruptions give rise to new islands in the ocean. The tree grows taller, and loses its leaves in the winter.
7. Humans can know the contingent order in the universe.

 These principles form the basis of any knowledge I can gain about the universe around me. While I cannot “prove” them, I assume their truthfulness in my everyday experience of the world around me. They form the common sense out of which we view the world. Their denial would mean that there is no way to truly objectively know anything. There are philosophical systems that do indeed deny one or more of these first principles with very interesting consequences. We will address these as they relate to our discussions at hand throughout the blog.

 

To Know the Truth

 

 There are five basic questions we can ask ourselves about any object of knowledge.

 

Is it true?

 

Is it knowable? Can I know it?

 

Can I give reasons for it? Can I prove it?

 

Can I be certain about it? Can I have certainty?

 

Can I have scientific certainty?

 

We will address the first of these questions here. The remainder will be addressed as we outline our philosophical system of inquiry.

 

Quid est Veritas?

 

Truth looked at philosophically is an assessment of reality according to the mind. Since truth may be taught to others, it is also an adequate expression of reality that others can share in a meaningful way. Philosophy does not remain in the realm of ideas and principles. It helps us to analyze an experienced reality. This analysis leads to something very concrete and objective. It is the road that is followed by those who ask questions, are seeking to know themselves and the meaning of the world around them. It leads us to a discovery of what is true and real.

 

So what do we mean when we say something is true?

 

1. Truth is the equation, conformation, correspondence of object and intellect.

 

2. A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to reality.

 

3. A thought is said to be true because it conforms to a thing or person.

 

4. A thing or person is said to be true because it conforms to a thought.

 

5. To know the truth of a proposition is to know what causes that proposition to be true.

 

6. The truth of a proposition may be caused by the truth of another proposition.

 

7. The truest proposition may be the proposition which is always true.

 

8. The truest proposition may also be the proposition which causes other propositions to be true, and which does not depend on the truth of other propositions.

 

9. To make a true statement is to say of what is, that it is, or to say of what is not, that it is not.

 

10. To make a false statement is to say of what is not, that it is, or to say of what is, that it is not.

 

11. ‘That which is’ cannot simultaneously be ‘that which is not.’ Being and non-being (existence and non-existence) cannot be predicated of the same subject at the same time in the same respect.

 

12. Although a proposition may potentially be either true or false, it cannot be both true and false at the same time in the same respect.

 

13. A proposition may appear to be true, and yet may be false. A proposition may appear to be false, and yet may be true.

 

14. If a proposition is not necessarily false, then it may possibly be true.

 

15. If a proposition is not necessarily true, then it may possibly be false.

 

16. A proposition which is necessarily true cannot possibly be false.

 

17. A proposition which is necessarily false cannot possibly be true.

 

18. The appearance of something may differ from the true reality of that thing.

 

19. Moreover, the appearance of something may be relative to the position of an observer, and may depend on the opinions and attitudes of the observer.

 

20. Things may not appear the same to everyone, and may have contradictory appearances.

 

Introduction

In an Interest of Full Disclosure


Before I begin and in an effort at full disclosure, I want to say, up front, that I am a Catholic who happens to live in 21st century America. I love the Church and am eternally grateful for the gift of being one of her children. Likewise, I am an unabashed, 100%, card-carrying, VERY AMATEUR Thomist. It is from these two vantage points that I come at the issues discussed in this blog.

Why? I am Catholic because I have come to realize that the Catholic Church contains the fullness of truth about God as revealed in His Son, Jesus, His creation, and His people. The older I get; the more I read and study; the more certain I am in this conclusion.

I am a Thomist (really a baby Thomist) because I find that Thomas Aquinas presents a philosophical and theological view of the universe that rings true based on my common experience as a human being living and existing in this universe. Aquinas is arguably the most important medieval philosopher, and he is still extremely influential in philosophy today. It is not that I don’t find truth in non-Thomist philosophies. It is that I find the most complete, common sensical, logical philosophical understanding of the universe in Thomas Aquinas. Others disagree with me. That’s fine, but this is where I am coming from.

A Brief Roadmap of Where We Will Be Going

As mentioned in the above description of this blog, I will be exploring three main areas: the existence and nature of God; the nature of Man (in particular the existence and immortality of the human soul); and natural law as the basis for ethics/morality. All three concepts are rejected in modern Western culture – no God, no soul, no natural law. In my discussions, I will show not only that these three concepts are reasonable, possible and probable but that they are indeed true. I will show that God does exist. I will show that man does have an immortal soul. And I will show that natural law does indeed exist and is the foundation for ethical and moral behavior. We will address each of these topics in the order they are presented above – God, soul, natural law.

However before we launch into these topics, I feel it necessary to address two items of initial preparation. As a result of our modern Western culture, I feel it is necessary to first outline the basics of a philosophical understanding of the universe – as it comes to us from the ancient Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle, through the medieval Scholastics, most importantly Thomas Aquinas. For this will form the basis of argument in exploring the main topics of this blog, and unfortunately, such philosophical inquiry is no longer part of modern education.

As part of this philosophical outline, I will address the whole concept of “truth”. As an unfortunate byproduct of our Western relativism and subjectivism, we must first establish that there is objective truth. Then, establish that we can know this truth. And finally, describe how we know something is indeed true.

All right now that we have a map, let’s get underway!

New Look - New Sharper Focus

Welcome to my redesigned and re-focused blog.  The new design and the new title for the blog "Quid est Veritas?" highlights a rethinking of my efforts thus far.

In this blog, I want to address head on some of the fundamental philosophical (and theological) ideas that have not only been called into question by modern Western society - but have been flat out rejected - a rejection that has had serious implications for our culture and society.

In this blog, I will positively show that man can arrive at the knowledge of the existence of God, that man has an immortal soul, and that the natural law is the true basis of human morality and ethics.  Concurrently, I will show the irrationality (indeed the insanity) of the so called "new atheism" (which isn't really new), modern moral relativism, cultural subjectivism, and extreme materialism so characteristic of 21st century Western culture.

I invite your comments, arguments, and ideas so long as they are thoughtfully, civilly expressed.  I will make every effort to avoid overly polemical statements and ask my readers to do so as well.

Finally, ad hominem arguments are probably the weakest of all - not to mention the most distasteful.  Any such statments or arguments will be removed from the blog.

Thank you.  I look forward to your comments.