Premise: Science based on empirical evidence is rational and inordinately disrespected. Religion based on belief is irrational and inordinately respected.
The major work done in Chapter 1 is the juxtaposition of modern science and religion. Dawkins bemoans the lack of respect he perceives modern science receiving, and denounces the alleged fact that religion receives so much respect and deference.
But this is a false dichotomy as I will point out in this post and the following.
Empiricism strictly defined means observation or experience. If you observe something, you can empirically prove it happened. If you don’t observe it, you cannot empirically prove it. You may be able to prove its truth in other ways – logical deduction or logical induction for example – but you cannot prove its truth empirically.
Consider for a moment the motions of the earth – its rotation on its axis and its revolution around the sun. Both are standard scientific facts taught in our schools. These facts are ubiquitous permeating our collective mindset. Yet I don’t feel the earth’s surface moving at 1000 miles per hour due to its rotation. I don’t sense the earth moving 67,000 miles per hour around the sun. Indeed, our common language indicates how strongly we don’t sense these motions. We talk about the sun coming up or going down.
I have no experience to base the truth of the claims that our earth moves in these ways. Yet, I accept the truth of these propositions because I accept the authority that taught them to me. The motions of the earth are a matter of belief, credence. Furthermore for most of us, it is a matter of unconscious belief. Even among the most scientifically literate, many have not considered on what grounds they believe and say these things. It is one thing to trust the word of an expert. It is another level of belief completely to not even be conscious of the fact that one is taking another’s word.
Our “knowledge” of the motions of the earth is not an empirical conclusion based on personal and direct observation and experience. Rather, it is part of an unrecognized belief system attained in childhood. Similar arguments can be made to our knowledge of the roundness of the earth. We all “know” the earth is round. Yet very few of us have directly observed the earth from space. Very few of us have flown around the earth in orbit. True, we have seen pictures of the earth taken from space, but the photographs are not direct evidence – direct personal observation. We trust that the ones telling us the pictures are accurate and true are indeed telling us the truth. We “know” the roundness of the earth and its motions from unconscious belief in science.
In such ways, modern science permeates our collective mindset. We identify with the conclusions of modern science to such an extent that we consider ourselves in some way superior in knowledge to our predecessors. We even perpetuate the myth that the medieval man was a victim of ideological and religious strictures preventing him from knowing the roundness of the earth. The historical fact is that the ancients as well as medieval men were familiar with the curvature of the earth – allowing one to see ships at a distance from the crow’s nest but not the deck – seeing approaching ships “rise” over the horizon as they drew closer to port. Yet we teach our children that Columbus proved the earth round in 1492 – and thus perpetuate a myth that in part helps to protect and perpetuate the system of unconscious belief in science.
These examples highlight the distinction between knowledge and belief and that we often do not know where one begins and the other ends. In the case of the earth’s motion, we know what others tell us about it and we believe it to be true.
Commonly, knowledge means anything we accept as relatively certain for whatever reason. This is knowledge in an improper sense. I have knowledge proper only when I come to conclusions based on facts and principles that I personally have experienced, observed, or apprehended and if required, based on a chain of reasoning that I have walked through myself. Belief commonly refers to having a level of probable, but not necessarily certain, conviction that is usually based on the word of another. In this sense, improper knowledge is a type of belief. Belief in a proper sense means trusting the word of another.
If I say, “I believe the moon is full” and I am looking at the moon and it is a full moon, then I am using the word “believe” improperly. In such a situation, I know the moon is full through direct experience and observation. I cannot know and believe the same thing at the same time in the same manner. If I know something, someone telling me it does not change my state to one of both knowledge and belief. If I say I believe in my friend and I know him, then I must be referring to different attributes of my friend. For example, I know his basic character and I believe he will make good decisions.
Empirically speaking – I Believe
Belief is as much a component of modern science as it is of theology.
Consider the craters on the moon. We were taught that these craters were formed by meteors. I personally have seen the craters on the moon through a telescope. It would seem that these craters offer empirical evidence of meteors supporting what I was taught and believe.
But these craters are empirical evidence of nothing at all. Strictly speaking, I cannot empirically draw the conclusion that meteors formed the craters I saw. I did not and have not personally observed a meteor impacting the moon and forming a crater. Therefore, I cannot empirically prove the proposition that meteors caused these craters.
Even if I did observe a meteor impacting the moon’s surface forming a crater, I can only attest that this meteor formed this crater. As a strict empiricist, I cannot apply this one observation to the millions of other lunar craters because I did not observe how each of those craters was formed. Because I did not observe their formation, they could have been created by a process unknown to me.
But you might be thinking, this guy is getting quite ridiculous. Of course the craters on the moon were formed by meteors. Scientists have observed such incidents many times and have recreated such events in the laboratory. The evidence from all these confirm that meteors created the craters.
But as a strict empiricist, I cannot accept your testimony or the testimony of those many scientists. To do so would be to trust someone else’s senses, experience, observations that I cannot be sure are trustworthy.
Even if you saw a crater formed by meteor impact, I cannot trust your observation unless I directly observed you observing the crater as it was being formed. If you saw it and I observed you see it, I would empirically know that your observations were correct.
Now it is almost certain that the lunar craters were indeed formed by meteor impact. I know this because this is what science and scientists have taught me. I accept their testimony because I recognize their authority and expertise in this area.
The scientists arrived at this conclusion through formal logic, through induction from evidence provided by experiments which they claim are similar to meteor impact, etc. But the scientists did not arrive at this conclusion through empirical observation.
When I read in a scientific journal about the experiments and observations that led to the conclusion about crater formation, I accept the conclusions. I believe the information because I trust the person who wrote the article. I trust the peers who reviewed the article. In short, I trust a person or group of persons.
I could not do science without this belief or credence. Belief is critical to scientific endeavors, for even the strictest empiricist has not performed all the foundational experiments in his discipline, nor has he personally created all the instruments through which the experiments were performed. Yet he should do both, in order to be sure that everything worked in the way he thinks they work. He cannot do this. Even if he tried to be a strict empiricist, given the current state of knowledge, he wouldn't live long enough to discover anything really valuable.
Craters, Rotating Orbs, and Revolution – What an Impact!
I accept the motions of the earth and the craters of the moon. I was taught about these in school. I have done no experiment, made no observation, no analysis of data – I simply accept it because that is what I was taught. My belief about each of these matters hangs from a chain of other beliefs – trust in my teachers, trust in those who taught my teachers, and ultimately trust in the scientists who discovered these facts. Over time, my life experiences have strengthened my trust in these authorities. I have learned how to judge who are real authorities and who are not. But even now, I do not have proper knowledge of the motions of the earth or the craters on the moon. My certainty of belief rests on the trustworthiness of authority and its attending cultural structure. My belief about the earth’s motions is not knowledge proper but very reasonable and necessary human faith.
Scientists who have not done the experiments, made the observations, or done the analysis directly also operate on belief (have faith) based on authority. Nonetheless, they have a degree of certainty that I lack because they have ancillary knowledge that gives the statements about the earth’s motion or the formation of lunar craters more believability. With this background they can personally understand something of the explanations of these phenomena. Knowledge of these ancillary facts gives scientists reasons that interlock at multiple places with what they are told about the earth’s motions and the lunar craters. Such interlocking points give scientists valid reason to give greater weight to the conclusions given to them by authority. But it still remains that unless they do the experiments, make the observations, and do the analysis personally they do not know in the proper sense.
In the Know
As we have seen not all knowledge is direct knowledge. There are things that I can deduce from facts, experiences, observations, even beliefs that create a chain from which a new piece of knowledge hangs. For instance from the fact that I am typing on a keyboard, I can deduce that someone manufactured the keyboard. This knowledge is just as real as the first. However as I proceed to more complicated and multi-tiered reasoning, the possibility of error in my reasoning increases. The need for checking and rechecking my reasoning also increases. I must always be careful to proceed from what is more known to me to what is less known.
All of us depend on improper knowledge and belief. Because much of this type of knowledge contains only virtual or probable certainty, we should attempt to bring as many things as prudently possible under the umbrella of real knowledge – beginning first with the most important things and moving in order of importance to as many other things as dictated by our abilities, time, and station in life. We cannot know everything. It is a gain in proper knowledge to understand that we depend on each other’s truthfulness and accuracy to do what we do well with minimum error.
