God, Aquinas and Dawkins: Preface to My Response to Arguments in Chapter 1

Preface to My Response to Dawkins Arguments in Chapter 1

The power of modern science (and the engineering technologies derived from basic science) to explain, control, and manipulate the physical universe is undeniable.  In the wake of the scientific revolution, we have reached a standard of living unknown and unimagined by the ancients.  Our ability to understand the intricacies of the operation of the universe and our ability to explain the basic operations and processes of nature are unparalleled.  The scientific method is indeed a very powerful tool.

I have no argument with Dawkins here.  If you are looking for an understanding of the processes and operations of the physical universe, modern science provides this.  I share Dawkins wonder at the lawful order of the universe.  I am fascinated by the explanation and description of this order provided by science.

The question is not about the explanation of the order in the universe.  The fundamental question is the fact that the order can be explained at all.  Why is there such order?  Why is the universe so intelligible?  Why does anything exist at all?

The answer to such questions is beyond the ability of the empirical sciences.  They lie outside the scope of science.  Science can describe the order.  Science can uncover the underlying laws and principles of the universe.  But the reason for the order, the fact that anything exists at all cannot be described and cannot be uncovered empirically.  I can experimentally, empirically discover and test the order, laws, and principles that govern the universe.  But there is no experimental, empirical test that shows why the universe is as it is.  There is no experimental, empirical test to answer “why” anything exists at all.  Science can explain how things exist, how things change and become other things, how the universe has developed – but it is beyond the scope of science to explain why there is a universe at all.

This is an important point for in it is the crux of the whole “God question”.  This point needs to be clear to the reader before we go on. 

Let’s use Darwinian evolutionary theory as an example.  In common language, evolution by natural selection explains “why” there is such diversity in species.  However in this example, “why” has a different meaning from how I used it above.  Evolution describes the process of how the species we experience now came to exist.  Evolution describes how living organisms developed from simpler materials, changed over time through natural selection, and became the great variety of species we see today.  Evolution answers the question of how life came to exist as it does now.  Similarly, the child’s question of why it rains can be answered by the description of the processes of evaporation, condensation, and precipitation.  And the question why there is a rainbow can be answered by the description of the refraction of light through water droplets.  But none of these descriptions answers the fundamental question of why the universe operates in this way – why is the universe such as it is that evolution, evaporation, and refraction occur at all?  Why is the universe such as it is that the human mind can discover, describe, and understand this order?  Conceivably we can imagine or think about a universe that operates by different laws and principles – a universe ordered differently from the one we find ourselves in – but the point remains that it wouldn’t be the universe that is.

Empirical science cannot and does not explain why there is a universe that operates in the way it does.    We can and have discovered many of these laws and principles – and I agree with Dawkins in that there are many things about the physical universe we currently do not understand or only have limited understanding of – and I agree that the natural sciences are our best hope in eventually describing the principles, laws, and processes that underlie them.

My contention is that Dawkins got the whole thing terribly wrong – not because of his disbelief in God – but because he missed this central point.  The acceptance of the truth of evolution by natural selection, or its rejection, has no bearing on the essential “God Question”.  Scientific explanations and theories simply cannot address the question of God’s existence.

The scientific enterprise does indeed yield truth about the physical universe.  But as I have alluded, there are questions to which the truths of science offer no answer.  This does not mean that such questions are unanswerable.  It means that we must approach them from a different angle utilizing different tools.   “Not every truth admits of the same mode of manifestation, and a well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits" (Summa contra gentiles, 1.3).

These fundamental questions about reality are the purview of philosophy which, according to Aristotle by way of Aquinas, is “the science of truth, not any and every truth but that truth that is the origin of all truth and appertains to the first principle of the being of all things; hence its truth is the principle of all truth, for things are in truth as they are in being” (Summa contra gentiles, 1.1).  Wisdom is the consideration of this truth – truth that lies at the heart of all reality.  Aquinas says, “Of all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the more perfect, the more sublime, the more useful, and the more agreeable” (Summa contra gentiles, 1.2).  It is the intent of this blog to pursue that truth.

For some this may seem to be a matter of some abstrusity.  Others may find my philosophical arguments as an exercise in splitting hairs.  Some may just find the whole thing rather frivolous.  To all of these folks, I ask your patient indulgence.  Stick with me and we will get to our destination in due time.  I also offer G. K. Chesterton’s definition of philosophy:  “Philosophy is merely thought that has been thought out. It is often a great bore. But man has no alternative, except between being influenced by thought that has been thought out and being influenced by thought that has not been thought out”. 

The problem with Dawkins is that he presents thoughts that haven't been thought out.  A further problem is that he has presented them to a Western culture that just plain no longer thinks at all.

So let’s get thinking, shall we?

God, Aquinas, and Dawkins: Chapter 1 The God Delusion (Part 1)

Before I begin discussing Chapter 1 of the book, let me describe the method I will use in this and the following posts. There are many statements, premises, arguments that Dawkins makes throughout the book. Some have counted upwards of 160 separate premises. The book is written in conversational style marked by strong passion and even polemics. It is clear that Dawkins did not mean to write a philosophical treatise but wrote in a manner to reach the greatest number of people. As such, he often makes bold statements that are not supported by evidence or fact as well as making provocative and denigrating statements about religion in general.


I will be posting my response to each chapter in the book. For each chapter, I will provide a very brief synopsis of the chapter. Then I will outline or delineate the major premises Dawkins makes in the chapter. Finally I will respond to each premise. In my response I will try to outline the philosophical history/roots of each idea. I will also show the fundamental error or mistake underlying each idea. I will then discuss the correction to each of these ideas. I will try to limit my posts to addressing one premise (or a very few if appropriate). Thus for some chapters there will be more than one post.

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Summary of Chapter 1

In Chapter 1, Dawkins begins laying the foundation upon which he will build the remainder of the book. Chapter 1 draws a sharp dichotomy between modern science and religion. The title of the chapter, "A deeply religious non believer" is a partial quote from Albert Einstein, who described his "religion" as an awe of nature and its "magnificent structure." The main thrust of the chapter is that science deserves respect (which it doesn't get) whereas religion deserves little or no respect (which it receives).

The first section of the chapter uses Einstein to illustrate that awe and wonder at the grandeur of the universe and its underlying structure are not necessarily religious sentiments – religious in the sense of believing in a Creator God. He goes to great length to show how Einstein sometimes used religious language to capture the powerful emotions he felt. But quotes from Einstein show that even though he used “God-talk” to describe these feelings he personally did not believe in a personal God. Dawkins quotes Einstein, “It was, of course, a lie what you read about my religious convictions, a lie which is being systematically repeated. I do not believe in a personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly. If something is in me which can be called religious then it is the unbounded admiration for the structure of the world so far as our science can reveal it.”

Dawkins argues that such transcendent wonder at the universe has been monopolized by religion in past centuries but is not necessarily characteristic of only religious believers. Many modern scientists who are avowed atheists hold such feelings at heart.

He defines atheists as philosophical naturalists. Dawkins writes, “An atheist in this sense of philosophical naturalist is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles - except in the sense of natural phenomena that we don't yet understand. If there is something that appears to lie beyond the natural world as it is now imperfectly understood, we hope eventually to understand it and embrace it within the natural. As ever when we unweave a rainbow, it will not become less wonderful.” A quote from Julian Baggini further illustrates his point: “What most atheists do believe is that although there is only one kind of stuff in the universe and it is physical, out of this stuff come minds, beauty, emotions, moral values - in short the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to human life."

Dawkins also writes, “human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain.”

He then defines terms:

“A theist believes in a supernatural intelligence who, in addition to his main work of creating the universe in the first place, is still around to oversee and influence the subsequent fate of his initial creation. In many theistic belief systems, the deity is intimately involved in human affairs. He answers prayers; forgives or punishes sins; intervenes in the world by performing miracles; frets about good and bad deeds, and knows when we do them (or even think of doing them). A deist, too, believes in a supernatural intelligence, but one whose activities were confined to setting up the laws that govern the universe in the first place. The deist God never intervenes thereafter, and certainly has no specific interest in human affairs. Pantheists don't believe in a supernatural God at all, but use the word God as a nonsupernatural synonym for Nature, or for the Universe, or for the lawfulness that governs its workings. Deists differ from theists in that their God does not answer prayers, is not interested in sins or confessions, does not read our thoughts and does not intervene with capricious miracles. Deists differ from pantheists in that the deist God is some kind of cosmic intelligence, rather than the pantheist's metaphoric or poetic synonym for the laws of the universe. Pantheism is sexed-up atheism. Deism is watered-down theism.”

He sums up part one and sets the stage for the chapter’s second part: , “I wish that physicists would refrain from using the word God in their special metaphorical sense. The metaphorical or pantheistic God of the physicists is light years away from the interventionist, miraclewreaking, thought-reading, sin-punishing, prayer-answering God of the Bible, of priests, mullahs and rabbis, and of ordinary language. Deliberately to confuse the two is, in my opinion, an act of intellectual high treason.”

In the second part of the chapter, Dawkins seeks to convince the reader of the irrationality of religion and its “undeserved respect” in the West. He rattles off a litany of violence, atrocities, and evil performed in the name of religion throughout the years especially in the late 20th-early 21st centuries.

Major Premises

1. The deep appreciation and wonder at the structure of the universe is not just characteristic of religious believers.
2. Nothing exists outside the material, physical universe.
3. Human thoughts, emotions, arise out of the physical features of the brain.
4. And a corollary to this, there is no immaterial soul.
5. Modern science, especially Darwinian evolutionary science, explains the origins and workings of the universe.
6. If there is something that appears to lie beyond the natural world as it is now imperfectly understood, science will eventually understand it and embrace it within the natural.
7. The theistic belief in a personal God who created the universe, oversees and influences it, and is intimately involved in human affairs is false. No God exists.
8. Atheistic science is rational.
9. Religion is irrational.
10. Religion is a major source of violence and evil in the world.

In the next post, I will respond to these major premises.

God, Aquinas, and Dawkins: Preface to The God Delusion

In the preface to his work, Dawkins lays out what he hopes to accomplish in The God Delusion. He seeks to encourage those raised in a religious tradition who “are unhappy in it, don’t believe it, or are worried about the evils that are done in its name; people who feel vague yearnings to leave their parents’ religion and wish they could, but just don’t realize that leaving is an option” to realize that “atheism is a realistic aspiration, and a brave and splendid one”. He assures the reader that atheists can be happy, balanced, moral, and intellectually fulfilled. He goes on to bolster the self-esteem of his fellow atheists by stating that being an atheist “is something to be proud of, standing tall to face the far horizon, for atheism nearly always indicates a healthy independence of mind and, indeed, a healthy mind”.


He continues by delineating numerous evils committed in the name of religion asking us, along with John Lennon, to imagine a world with no religion. To his credit, he admits that religion is not the root of all evil, but he is clear that he considers religion to be a great force for evil. He continues to juxtaposition religion with reason – identified with the natural sciences. From this he draws the conclusion that religion is not necessary to leading an ethical life.


He presents belief in God as one hypothesis about the universe that should and can be tested just as other hypotheses. He goes on to assert that Darwinian natural selection and similar scientific theories are superior to this "God hypothesis" —the illusion of intelligent design— in explaining the living world and the cosmos.

In his refutation of religion, he describes the religious training of children as child abuse.  Children should not be labeled as “Christian children” or “Muslim children” for they are not capable of giving free assent to these religious views.  Rather they are the subjects of indoctrination.  As he says in the preface, “If you are religious at all, it is overwhelmingly probable that your religion is that of your parents.   If you were born in Arkansas and you think Christianity is true and Islam false, knowing full well that you would think the opposite if you had been born in Afghanistan, you are the victim of childhood indoctrination.  Mutatis mutandis if you were born in Afghanistan”.


As I mentioned in my last post, the ideas and arguments put forward in this book are nothing new.  The passionate attack on religion and religious belief that marks the tenor of the book is also not new.  What is new is that a book so short on well reasoned argumentation; so short on accurate portrayals and descriptions of opposing views; so impoverished of a true understanding of histroy can be such a powerful influence on so many.  This fact alone is enough to indicate the weakness in our educational system.


With that rant complete, let's look at the argument that religion and science necessarily oppose each other.

God, Aquinas, and Dawkins

Now that I have described Aquinas' basic ways to know the existence of God, let's turn our attention to the major arguments refuting the existence of God. Specifically, I want to address the arguments and thoughts of the what is termed the “new atheism”, the most famous proponent of which (arguably) is Richard Dawkins.

In his two bestselling works, The God Delusion and The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins takes aim at belief in God specifically and religion generally. Dawkins claims that God certainly does not exist and that those who believe in such existence are deluded. In both books, he asserts that natural evolution and other scientific theories adequately explain the existence and order found in the universe.

He particularly focuses on an argument from design, more commonly termed intelligent design. He points out the age old human effort to explain the apparent design in the universe. Dawkins suggests that there are basically two competing explanations or hypotheses. One attributes this design to a divine designer. The other shows how science has shown how something more complex can arise from simple origins and principles. He goes on to assert that the alternative to an intelligent designer is not blind chance but natural selection.

Along with Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennet, Dawkins represents what has been termed the “new atheism”. But as we will see, their brand of atheism and their arguments are anything but new. In the 13^th century, Thomas Aquinas was already familiar with these arguments which he clearly understood and addressed. The roots of these arguments, indeed the very arguments themselves, can be found in the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle.

Over the next several posts, I will address each of the major arguments and points made by Dawkins showing their historical roots as well as the fallacious thinking that underlies them. I invite any readers to make comments, ask questions, share insights, and even try to refute or support my ideas. All I ask is that unlike Dawkins himself, we maintain a decorum of respect and thoughtful dialogue.

The Existence of God - Part Six: Aquinas' Fifth Way

Aquinas’ fifth way is a teleological argument. It is a proof from the final causes of the things around us.


Aquinas states the argument thus:

“The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”

In other words, the adaptation of means to ends is evidence and sign of an intelligent cause. The universe provides us on every side with examples of the adaptation of means to ends. It follows logically then that the universe is the work of an intelligent cause.

Before we more fully explicate this argument, let’s define some terms and clarify some concepts. A cause is termed a “means” to a particular result when its action has been determined in view of that result as an end. Works of humans are as a rule means. A bit in the horse’s mouth is a means of control. The use of a knife is a means of carving wood. The automobile is a means of transporting people and materials.

But means are not limited to only rational actors. Means are anything that serve as efficient causes. As Aquinas sums it up: “Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance” (Summa Theologiae I.44.4).

For example, an ice cube floating in a glass of water causes the water to grow colder. The ice cube is an agent that if unimpeded will cause the water to grow colder. It will not cause the water to change into iced tea, boil, catch fire, or have no effect at all. In the natural order of things, we expect that placing an ice cube in a glass of water will cool the water because that is the usual and normal effect. There is in ice a potency, power, or disposition that inherently indicates or points to the generation of this specific effect. The ice cube is an efficient cause of coldness. The generation of the coldness of the water is the final cause of the ice.

To state in general terms. If there is a regular efficient causal connection between a cause A (ice cube) and an effect B (the coldness of the water), then generating B is the final cause of A in the sense that A inherently “points to” B or is “directed at” B as its natural effect.

Examples of such final causation abound in the natural environment. The regularity of the moon orbiting the earth is such a one. The moon just doesn’t orbit the earth in a general regularity; it orbits the earth specifically rather than swinging widely out to Venus or Mars or rather than stopping suddenly for 3 days and then resuming its path. No the moon’s orbit is so regular that we can use it to mark time. An acorn will always give rise to an oak tree. Acorns don’t regularly give rise to peach trees or monkeys. The acorn then is inherently directed to become an oak tree as its natural end.

In fact, such regularity, such predictability is a hallmark of the universe – and is exploited by modern science in man’s search for understanding the physical laws of nature. In each such case, efficient causes don’t just happen to produce specific results. The efficient cause, e.g, the ice floating in the glass of water, is inherently directed toward certain specific effects as if towards a “goal”. If I want an oak tree in my front yard, I would plant an acorn not a walnut. If I want a nice cold drink of water, I put ice in my glass.

It doesn’t matter if such cause-effect relationships are consciously based or not. Goal-directedness, i.e., final causation, can and does exist in the natural world apart from conscious awareness. Ice results cool the water whether or not a conscious being placed the ice in the water or not. The moon will regularly orbit the earth even if no one ever noticed or studied the motion. An acorn falling to the ground in a remote forest will still give rise to an oak tree – even if no one ever enjoys its shade.

But, critics say, in order for something to act as a cause, it must exist. How can something exert an effect, be a final cause, even before it exists. To say that an oak tree is the final cause of an acorn suggests that somehow the oak tree exerts influence on the acorn to go through all the various stages of its development even before the oak tree actually exists.

For a cause to be efficacious – including a final cause – it has actually to exist in some way. It’s not just that for A to be the efficient cause of B, A must exist – as it obviously must – but also that for B to be the final cause of A, B must also exist, in some sense. Otherwise, being nonexistent, it could not be efficacious. Hence for the “coldness” that the ice generates to function as a final cause, it has to exist in some way; for an oak tree to function as the final cause of an acorn, it too has to exist in some way; and so forth.

Now as we have already explored, there are two ways for something to exist. A thing may exist in the natural world, or a thing may exist in an intellect. Oak trees do exist in the natural world. However right now as I write this in my office, I am thinking of an oak tree. The oak tree that I am holding in mind has existence, although its existence is different from the oak tree outside my window.

What does this have to do with the whole notion of final causes? Perhaps another example will help.

Think of a carpenter who decides to design and build a chair. The design of the chair does not exist in the natural world. The design is something held in the intellect of the carpenter. The carpenter is the cause of certain effects – the shaping and construction of the materials. But the reason he is able to do this is that the effect, the chair, exists as an idea in his intellect before it exists in reality. This is how the idea of the chair can serve as a final cause – by means of its form or essence in the carpenter’s intellect, if not yet in the natural world. And as mentioned above and elsewhere in this blog, this is the only way something not yet existent in the natural world can exist in any sense at all, and thus, have any effects at all: that is, if it exists in an intellect.

Now let’s consider the enormous number of causes that constitute the natural universe. Every one of them is directed toward a certain end or final cause. The acorn is directed to grow into an oak tree. The ice is directed to cooling down the water. But, it would seem, that almost all of the causes in the universe are not associated with any consciousness, thought, or intellect at all. Even animals and humans, who are conscious, are themselves comprised in whole or part of unconscious and unintelligent material components which themselves exhibit final causality, undergo changes directed to regular, predictable effects (final causes).

But as we have seen, final causes must have existence in some sense in order to be efficacious. It they do not have existence in the natural world, then the only place left for them to exist is in an intellect, and this intellect must exist outside the natural order altogether. For the causal relations in question are totally unintelligent: ice and acorns do not have intellects, nor is there any intelligence at the level of the even more fundamental causal processes studied by basic physics and chemistry. And all the intelligence that does exist within the material world – in us, for example – presupposes the operation of these unintelligent causal processes (since the existence of our bodies, and thus of us, presupposes them). So, there is no place left for the intellect in question to be than outside the natural order. That is to say, all the causal relations that exist in the natural order exist at all only because there is an intellect outside the natural order which “directs” causes to their effects.

This argument, you will notice, makes no mention of “intelligent design” nor does it hypothesize or try to explain the origins of the universe. Nor does the argument hinge on “irreducible complexity”. If all that existed was a single electron orbiting a single proton, the argument would still hold. The argument depends on the various causes here and now and which are directed to certain ends here and now. The argument is that such changes here and now could not exist at all apart from an intellect outside the natural order directing causes to effects. This includes any biological causes involved in evolution. The argument is a conceptual necessity. It is logically, conceptually impossible that there could be such final causation without a sustaining intellect.

Aquinas correctly equates this intelligence outside the natural order with God. It could not be otherwise. Whatever ultimately orders things to their ends must also be the ultimate cause of those things. Having an end is part of the nature or essence of a thing. For that nature or essence to be of something real, it must have existence. Whatever determines that a thing exists with a certain end is the same as that which conjoins its essence and existence. In other words, causes them to be.

As we have shown earlier, the ultimate or First Cause of things must be Being itself. Thus, this intelligence outside the natural order must be identical with the First Cause, with the Unmoved Mover, and with all the attributes we have shown to belong to God.

Thus, Aquinas is able to say simply, “Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God”.

The Existence of God - Part Five: Aquinas' Fourth Way

The henological argument, Aquinas’ fourth way,  is so called because in it we reason from multiplicity to unity (hen, unum) -  from goodness, truth, reality in the various forms in which experience makes them known to us, to a Being who is the Good, the True, the Real. Its scope is to show that the limited and partial manifestations of these perfections compel us to admit the existence of a Being in whom they find their complete realization - that multiplicity and imperfection are wholly inexplicable apart from unity and perfection - and finally that the One and Perfect is, in fact, a Personal God.

Aquinas states the argument thus:

“The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.”

To understand this argument, it may be helpful to recall what we discussed earlier regarding the ten categories.  The ten basic categories designate modes of being. The first is substance, and other nine are quantity, quality, relation, location, time, disposition (the arrangement of parts), rainment (being clothed, armed, etc.), action, and passion. These are the basic or ultimate groups into which real entities may be classified.  Each category contains some particular generic or specific attribute or “perfection”.  They express either the substantial nature of a being or some quantity, quality, relation, etc. belonging to it.
But perfections (attributes) such as reality, goodness, truth, unity, beauty, and the like, are perfections that are applied in all the categories equally.  The application of them is not confined to any special part, be it genus or differentia of nature.  There is no nature and no part of any nature of which they may not be predicated.  The animality and the rationality of Socrates are both real just as his qualities, quantity, etc.  Humanity is a good thing as is strength or size due to a human body or the relation of fatherhood.  One and all of these things can be objects of intellectual knowledge.  Therefore, they are true.  Because attributes such as goodness, truth, reality, etc. transcend the limits that restrict all other perfections to one or another of the categories, they are called transcendentals.

Two important consequences flow from the transcendental nature of these special perfections.  First, the transcendentals do not connote any limitation or imperfection.  Any attribute which is by its very nature restricted to a particular category inevitably involves imperfection because it is essentially finite.  But the transcendentals do not imply any category.  Rather, a transcendental such as goodness goes beyond or transcends the limits imposed by a category.  The apple pie that I made is good, but the pie made by my mother is better.  The goodness of each apple pie is predicated according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum in “goodness”.

Second, transcendentals are analogous and not univocal.  A generic or specific attribute is univocal.  It has the same signification in all the subjects of which it is predicated.  The notion or concept it expresses is always identically the same.  Thus the term ‘animal’ denotes precisely the same characteristics whether used to describe a human or an insect.  So far as this term is applied to them, the differences of the two classes, however fundamental, do not come under consideration.

It is not the same with analogous terms.  The concepts which these terms signify are not identically but proportionally the same.  The goodness of a man is not identical with the goodness of a horse nor can the goodness of each be expressed by a concept which remains the same as applied to each of them.  Yet they are proportionately similar.  A good man and a good horse are each seen as having that which constitutes the perfection of their respective natures.  In the goodness of a man, the requisite qualities are moral.  In the goodness of a horse, the requisite qualities are physical.

Now when the same attribute, in this case “goodness”, is found in a plurality of individuals, it is impossible that the attribute can belong to each of them in its own right and in virtue of its being the particular thing it is.  Even if there were only two such entities, either the one must have received it from the other, or both must owe the attribute to a cause outside them and of a higher order.

This follows from a metaphysical principle we discussed in Aquinas’ third way.  Wherever we have a union of diverse elements, that union postulates a cause.  In the third way, we dealt with the case of the combination of different elements in one concrete thing.  Here we are dealing with the combination of different individual entities in a single class.  The individuals that form the class of Man, are in virtue of their individuality utterly distinct.  But their common nature makes them specifically (not numerically) one – and a series of propositions can be framed regarding the abstract subject Man which can be verified of every individual in the class.

We cannot explain this unity apart from a common cause.  We cannot say that each member of the class is a man in virtue of his being himself, and because he is the distinct individual which he is.  Things are not united by the very thing through which they differ.  The principle of diversity is not and cannot be the principle of unity.  Individuality is the principle of diversity.  It follows that a perfection held in common must have been received from another.  And because diversity will never account for unity, we must conclude that there is a single cause to which the common perfection must be referred.

It is sufficient here to note that, as Aristotle points out, there can be no such thing as an immaterial essence of a material nature.  Matter is part and parcel of the essence of such things.  An immaterial essence of a horse or of a tree, subsisting as an individual separate thing, is a sheer contradiction in terms.  However, such natures can exist apart from matter as concepts of the mind – I can think of a horse in my mind – the horse in my mind while not having material existence still does have the nature of a horse – but unlike the material horse the one in my mind has no existence outside my mind.  I couldn’t plow my field with the horse in my mind.

Transcendental perfections, however, are different.   Matter is no necessary part of their essence.   'Being' or 'goodness,' considered in their essential nature, involve no limit, no imperfection.   The concept of goodness as such expresses goodness in an infinite degree.   If we desire to conceive a finite and restricted goodness we must ourselves introduce the note of limit.   It is true that, as we have experience only of finite things, our knowledge of goodness is necessarily of a goodness which is limited.   But this does not affect the significance of the term.   For the transcendentals are analogous -  the terms expressing them signify the transcendentals themselves, but do not connote the particular mode in which they are found in this or that subject.

Returning to the metaphysical principle discussed previously, we know that the perfections of being, goodness and truth, as they are known to us in experience, must, as we have seen, be referred to a single cause of a higher order.  Now, when we were considering material essences, we recognized that this immaterial higher cause could not be something of the same specific nature, since such a nature can only be found upon the plane of material existence. The higher cause which confers a material perfection must be of an altogether different kind. It must, indeed, somehow contain the perfection which it confers, or it could not give it. But it contains it eminently and not formally. 

As regards transcendental perfections the case is otherwise. Goodness and reality are not perfections proper to a lower plane of being. Here there is no question of a cause which only contains the perfection which it gives, eminently. Goodness and reality will be found formally in the cause producing them. The cause of goodness will itself be good: the cause of reality will be real; though the mode in which these perfections belong to it will not be identical with, but analogous to, the same perfections as found in its effects.

In fact, it should be clear that the cause must be the perfection itself as a subsistent entity.  The formal cause of goodness will not be something that possesses goodness, nor is it identical with goodness.  In such cases, it would be composed of diverse elements and we would need to seek the cause outside it.  It must be none other than subsistent Goodness.

This subsistent Goodness – goodness itself – absolute goodness – is not restricted to some particular mode.  It is goodness in its fullness, i.e. infinite goodness.  For it must be a goodness which has no cause higher than itself, and it follows of necessity that the goodness with which we are dealing knows no limits.
Pure goodness is absolutely simple (not composite) and is uncaused.  But pure goodness is as the same time real.  Thus it is not just uncaused goodness but uncaused being – not possessing being but is being.  Therefore, it is infinite being as well as infinite goodness.

The same arguments can be made of any other transcendental – truth, unity, intelligence, will, etc.
In such manner each transcendental becomes identical with one another, coalescing into one simple infinite Being.  This infinite Being is manifestly what we signify by the name of God.

The Existence of God - Part 4: Aquinas' Third Way

The third way of demonstrating God’s existence is from contingency. It is closely related to the demonstration from efficient causation – the second way.


Aquinas states the third way:

“The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.”

Before going further, it might be helpful to define some terms. A contingent being is one that need not exist. In other words, it may exist or it may not exist. Experience shows me that such contingent beings do indeed exist. I clearly see things come into existence and then pass out of it. Animals, plants, humans all have their life spans – being born, growing and developing, and then dying. Inanimate substances enter into compositions forming new substances with properties different from those of its constituents. After a time, the compound is again resolved into its original elements.

Necessary being is that which is incapable of not existing. Actual existence belongs to the very nature of necessary being just as to be three-sided belongs to the nature of a triangle. Actual existence is an essential attribute of necessary being. A necessary being must be self-existent.

Since contingent being may either exist or not exist, it is obvious that it cannot account for its own existence. If it was the sufficient reason for its own existence then it would be impossible for it to ever not exist – it would not be contingent. There must be some sufficient reason for its existence, and since it cannot be its own sufficient reason, we must look to something outside of it to explain its existence.

The conclusion is the same, even if we suppose a contingent being to have existed from all eternity. Once we admit that a thing is capable of non-existence, it follows of necessity that it owes its existence to something else, and this in the last resort, must be necessary being.

So the real question is what is “necessary being”. Modern materialism may answer that although individual substances are contingent, the whole vast collection of such substances taken in its entirety could be regarded as necessary. In other words, it is true that beings we experience all around us are contingent – animals, plants, rocks, humans, etc. But the universe as a whole can be regarded as necessary. That while the individual components and things contained within the vast universe are contingent, the universe is not. After all it is a scientific law that matter cannot be created or destroyed. So is this matter, the substratum common to all the existing things we observe in the universe, the necessary being we are searching for?

The answer, quite simply, is “no” for two reasons.

First, no collection or series of contingent beings, even if the series was infinite as regards time or space, could ever constitute a necessary being. If each member of the whole is contingent, then the whole, no matter its size or scope, does not contain within itself any sufficient reason for its existence – it simply cannot be self-existent.

Contingency is an attribute belonging to the essential nature of the object of which it is affirmed. Such attributes are predicable not merely of individuals but of the whole collection.

Likewise, the supposition that matter is the necessary being can be shown to be impossible. Matter is capable of receiving perfections that are not among its essential attributes. Matter can become a man, or gold, or a flower, etc. Each of these substances (man, gold, flower) has distinctive properties. But each of these properties is not essential to matter – for what is essential cannot be separated from it. So where do these properties come from?

Since they are not essential to matter, they must arise from the operation of some cause external to the matter. This leads us to a principle of prime importance, i.e., whenever two things essentially distinct one from the other are found in union, this must be due to the operation of an efficient cause outside and other than the things themselves. If two things essentially distinct, A and B, are found united or combined the reason cannot be found in A. A is the sufficient reason only for itself and its own essential attributes. Likewise it cannot be found in B. For example, think of a triangle. No cause is needed to explain why a triangle should have three angles. The attribute of having three angles results immediately from the essence of a triangle as a plane figure bounded by three straight lines. You simply cannot have a triangle without three angles. Now think of a wooden triangle. Wood is not triangular necessarily. Nor is a triangle necessarily wooden. The composition of these diverse elements of necessity supposes the operation of an efficient cause other than and outside the wood and triangle.

Necessary being is self-sufficient and self-existent. No agent can exist capable of conferring perfections upon necessary being. For this to be so, the agent must be other than and outside the necessary being. But such being other than and outside necessary being can only be contingent being. But contingent being owes whatever attributes it possesses in last resort to necessary being. Contingent being has nothing that is not already found in necessary being and cannot add anything to it. It follows then that matter which is a recipient for perfections cannot be necessary being.

“But”, it may be argued by some, “what if there are a plurality of necessary beings?” “Wouldn’t that invalidate the argument you just stated?”

A plurality of necessary beings is nonsensical . Let’s suppose there are two necessary beings, A and B. To be separate means they must in some way be distinct one from another. To be distinct means that A must have attributes not found in the B. But such attributes that provide this distinction are not essential to A – for if they were essential to the necessary being of A than they must, by definition, be found in the other necessary being B - which of course would dissolve any distinction. Furthermore if the attributes are not essential to A, they must arise from a cause other than and outside A. But if A is necessary being than it is self-existent and self-sufficient– meaning that no agent can exist capable of conferring perfections upon it. Thus the very nature of necessary being means that it can only be one.

Equally invalid is the pantheist contention (common to many Eastern religions as well as the New Age movement in the West) that contingent beings are merely modes of the one and all-inclusive Absolute - that they are manifestations of necessary being, and not entities possessed of a distinct though dependent existence. Here we may make appeal to the argument which we have just employed in regard of material substances. The contingent beings of experience are constantly undergoing changes and acquiring new perfections. This alone establishes that they are not modes of necessary being. A sheer contradiction is involved in the supposition that an agent exists, which can confer perfections on necessary being. Yet the acquisition of a perfection apart from an agent is, as we have seen, a metaphysical impossibility.

Thus, Aquinas states simply:

“Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.

This all men speak of as God.”

The Existence of God - Part 3: Aquinas' Second Way

Let’s Review: Cause


In the previous post, we discussed that there are two kinds of series of causes and effects. An accidentally ordered series is a series temporally sequenced. An example might be to consider the case of a father begetting a son, who in turn begets another. If the father dies after begetting the son, the son can still beget a son of his own for once in existence the son has the power to do this all by himself. He doesn’t need his father to remain in existence for him to be able to sire a son. Imagine a long line of such fathers begetting sons who in turn beget sons of their own. In every case, the son has the power to beget a son of his own even if his father goes out of existence. Each member of the series, each “causer” of a son, is independent of the previous members of the series. This series is accidentally ordered in that it is not essential to the continuation of the series that any earlier member of it remain in existence. We observe such accidentally ordered series all around us. A cue ball rolls across the table striking a billiard ball causing it to roll across the tables as well. Or the example of the long line of dominoes used in the previous post. An accidentally ordered series of causes and effects is one in which the continuation of the series is independent of the existence and/or continued action of earlier members in the series.

Accidentally ordered series extend backwards in time, and theoretically can extend back forever. Because each member of such a series has its causal powers independently of the existence or action of previous members in the series, there is nothing about the actions of the members existing here and now that requires that we trace it back to some first member existing in the past. Even if there was a first cause of an accidentally ordered series, I cannot prove its existence here and now from the actions/changes in the current members of the series. In fact, the series would continue even if the first mover no longer existed, or existed only for a brief moment – just long enough to get the series going. Thus, there is no way to philosophically prove that such a series ever had a beginning or a first member.

An essentially ordered series of causes and effects is a series where each cause is simultaneous to each effect. Think of a hand which is pushing a stone by means of a stick. The motion of the stone only happens as long as the stick is moving it, and the stick is moving only as long as the hand is pushing it. At every moment in which the stone is moving, the stick is moving and the hand is pushing. The stone and the stick as well, only move because and insofar as the hand moves them. Strictly speaking, it is the hand alone which is doing the moving of the stone. The stick is merely an instrument by which the hand accomplishes this. This series is essentially ordered because the latter members in the series have no independent motion of their own and derive the fact of their motion and their ability to move from the first member in the series. Without the earlier members in the series, and specifically without the first member, the series would not continue.

Essentially ordered series do not extend backwards in time but rather “downward” in the present moment since they are series in which each member depends simultaneously on other members which simultaneously depend in turn on yet other members, and so on. In essentially ordered series, the latter members of the series have no independent causal power of their own but are mere instruments of a first member. If the last member in the series exists, e.g., the moving stone, the series cannot, even in theory, extend back infinitely. In an essentially ordered series, the actualization of one potential depends on the simultaneous actualization of another potential, which depends on the simultaneous actualization of another, which depends on the simultaneous actualization of another, which …. While the series may extend a long way, it cannot extend infinitely for an essentially ordered causal series exists here and now (not backwards in time) and by its very nature must have a first member. There must be a first member that provides the causal power being transmitted throughout the series.

Now in order for there not to be an infinite regress, there must be a first member. This first member must itself be unmoved and unchangeable. For if it was moving or changing, it would be going from potential to actual and there would need to be something outside it actualizing its potential in which case it would no longer be the first member.

In the first way, we see that Aquinas identifies this first member, the First Mover, as God.

To Be or Not To Be

In his second way of proving the existence of God, Aquinas begins with the simple observation that things exist. In order for a thing to change, it must exist. In order for the universe to undergo change, it obviously must exist. Specifically, it must continue in existence from moment to moment. So why does it do so? Why does anything keep existing? What keeps the universe going?

Before we get into the “meat” of Aquinas second way, let’s take a moment to provide some background.

The tree outside my window exists. It has being. Two principles explain its being, i.e., essence and existence. For the actually existing tree, indeed for any thing that actually exists in the world, both essence and existence are necessary. Essence and existence are distinct from each other. This distinction is real.

Essence is the “what” of a thing. It is the quiddity of the thing, that which is known about it by the forming of a concept. In this way it is a formal principle, because it is abstracted by the intellect. It is a universal principle making many material beings to be of the same kind (e.g., horses, animals, men, fish, rocks, etc.).

But essence, “what a thing is”, is completely distinct from a thing’s existing, “that it is”. The essence of a thing does not indicate anything about whether that thing actually exists. The essence of a horse that exists in the physical world and the essence of a horse that doesn’t (an imaginary horse) are the same – they both have “horse-ness”. A thing’s existing is totally different from what kind of a thing it is. Therefore there must be something about really existing things that accounts for this. This is their existence. Existence then is that which makes essences “to be”, to exercise the act of existing. Aquinas identified the act of existing with the Latin term “esse”, to be.

The relationship of essence and esse is likened by analogy to that relationship between form and matter. Form determines and actualizes some part of matter. Similarly, esse actualizes the potency of a thing’s essence. This similarity is only analogous. Form can be separated from matter by abstraction. However, the esse and essence of a thing are not separable in real beings. Esse is logically prior to all other actuality because a thing cannot be in a certain way unless it first simply “is”. Because of this logical priority of existence, Aquinas calls esse “the most formal of all.” “It is the actuality of all acts” since a thing “is” in virtue of esse (existence) and “acts are of supposits” of what “is”.

The Second Way – Argument from Existence

Aquinas bases his second way of proving God’s existence on the observable fact that the universe does indeed exist.

“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”

As mentioned above, the question that Aquinas is posing is not whether the Universe has a beginning or not. He is not asking a question about what got things started or even about how long the Universe has been in existence. Rather taking the observable fact that the universe exists in such a way that its existence persists from one moment to the next, why does it do so? What keeps the universe going? What keeps the universe in existence?

Is there something in the natures of the physical things that exist in the universe that allows them to persist? The answer is quite simply no. Consider the nature or essence of any thing in the physical universe. Consider the essence of a human being. For argument’s sake, let’s agree with Aristotle that the essence of a human being is to be a rational animal. Does knowing that tell us anything about whether people really exist? Does it tell you whether Barak Obama, Aristotle, or Clark Kent exists? We know Barak Obama exists because we have seen him on television or met him in person. Aristotle doesn’t exist anymore. Clark Kent never existed outside the Superman comics and movies. So there is nothing about the essence of a thing that entails whether or not the thing really exists.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

As described above, the essence of a thing and the existence of a thing are distinct. There is nothing in the essence that necessitates existence. Something then needs to put essence and existence together for a thing to be real. That “something” cannot be the thing itself for to give itself existence a thing would have to exist already. So nothing can cause itself. Whatever comes into existence – whatever must have existence added to its essence in order for it to be real must be caused by another.

Aquinas is not saying that everything must have a cause. What is being said is that only what does not have existence on its own must have a cause, and since it cannot have existence on its own, this cause must be something other than itself.

To recap then, the essence of everything in the physical universe is distinct from its existence. Each of these things must be caused by something outside itself. From this, it becomes clear that the universe as a whole must have a cause outside itself.

As in the case of change, here we can identify two kinds of causal series: accidentally ordered and essentially ordered. Remember that accidentally ordered series are temporally sequenced, extending back in time. But again, Aquinas is not concerned with what events in the past led to what exists in the here and now. Rather, Aquinas is asking what is it that is keeping the things that exist, here and now, in existence here and now. What is sustaining the existence here and now?

Let’s return to an example we used above – the example of fathers begetting sons. Your father beget you but he is not what is sustaining you in being here and now. Remember that this represents an accidentally ordered series – your existence here and now is independent of your father’s existence or non-existence here and now. My own father died 18 years ago. Yet, I still exist.

No, what’s sustaining your existence is something like the current state of the cells of your body, which in turn are sustained by what’s going on at the molecular level, and the atomic level, along with gravitation, the weak and strong forces, and so forth – all of which whose essence is distinct from their existence and thus need a cause outside themselves. In short, we have another essentially ordered causal series which as we previously showed must end in a first cause.

In fact considering the universe as a whole, its elements, down to the smallest detail, consists of elements whose essence is distinct from their existence and thus cannot account for their own being from moment to moment. The universe as a whole must be sustained in being here and now by a cause outside itself, a First Cause, which simultaneously upholds the entire series.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause

This First Cause cannot itself be composed of essence and existence. For if it had both essence and existence, it would require something outside of itself to explain its own existence and thus would no longer be a first cause. The essence/existence distinction does not apply then to the First Cause. Rather the First Cause is pure existence, pure being – not a being, strictly speaking, but Being Itself, fully actualized.

Aquinas upon demonstrating the necessity of the First Cause further describes it as that “ to which everyone gives the name of God”.

The Existence of God - Part 2: Aquinas' First Way

Aquinas states that the existence of God can be proven by reason.  Although a Christian, he argues that the individual can arrive at knowledge of God’s existence without recourse to the Christian Scriptures but through the use of reason, logical demonstration.  He offers five ways to prove the existence of God through the use of reason.  The first way, an argument from change, he argues is the most obvious.

Aquinas writes, “The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion.  Aquinas following from Aristotle uses the term “motion” to refer to any change.  He continues by stating that “it is certain and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion”.  It is a clear and obvious fact of the world that things can change.

He goes on to explain that every change has a cause.  Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.

When something changes, it acquires a new characteristic.  A thing cannot change unless it has a potential to acquire the new characteristic and it does not already have that characteristic.  In any change, the thing undergoing the change must have the capacity or potentiality to be what it will become, and yet not actually be that which it will become.

In this demonstration, Aquinas uses two examples of change:  wood catching fire and a hand moving a staff.  For wood to catch fire, it must not actually be burning but must be capable of burning.  Wood catching fire involves the reduction of the wood’s potentiality of wood to burn to the actuality of it burning.  It must pass from the potential to catch fire to actually being on fire.  Wood that is not burning has the potential to catch fire.  Wood that is on fire no longer has the potential to catch fire because it is actually on fire.

But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.  Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

The cause of change must be something other than the thing changing.  A change brings about a new actuality, e.g., wood on fire, from what was first potential to this new actuality, e.g., wood not on fire but capable of being on fire.  So the new actuality (burning wood) cannot be the actuality that brings itself to be (wood already on fire cannot set itself on fire).  The cause precedes the effect, and therefore the effect cannot be its own cause.  A burning match cannot ignite itself.  Anything that is changing is being caused to change by something else.

The example of burning wood is an example of a temporal causal series.  The heating of the wood precedes in time the wood catching fire.  Another example might help.  Think of a long line of dominoes, each standing on end with a domino in front of it and behind it.  If I push over the first domino in this line, it will knock over the next domino.  The second domino will knock over the third and so on.  Each domino will knock over the next in sequence.  Now once I push over the first domino, my job is done.  I can simply walk away and the sequence will run its course without me.  Likewise any domino in the sequence could suddenly disappear after it pushed the next domino and the sequence would continue.  Each cause precedes each effect in time, but each effect must and does have a cause.  In fact, the line of dominos could stretch into infinity in either direction and the principle of “every change has a cause” would still hold true.  

Aristotle argued that the universe, the world, was eternal , with no beginning or end.  In this demonstration, Aquinas does not refute this even though as a Christian he believed that the world had a definite beginning point.  This demonstration is not about a beginning point, a moment of creation, for the world, but is about the fact that every change requires a cause outside of the thing that is changing and that this fact leads logically to the conclusion that God exists. 

But if one cannot arrive at God from a temporal series of causes, how can His existence be shown?  The answer comes in the next part of the demonstration.  Now that Aquinas has established the truth of every change needing a cause, he narrows his argument to a specific type of cause.

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again.  Here he considers only the case where the cause of a change is itself a process of change or motion.  He gives an example of such a case by citing a hand moving a staff.
In the example of a hand moving a staff, we do not have a temporal sequence of causes.  The hand does not initiate the staff’s movement as in the case of the dominoes.  No, the staff will move only as long as the hand moves it.  The cause of the change, i.e., the hand moving, is simultaneous to the change it effects, i.e., the movement of the staff, and continues and sustains the movement throughout the process.  Aquinas calls these kinds of causes (that act simultaneously to the process of change they effect) as per se causes.  Their effects are essentially subordinated to the causes, not temporally successive.

But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.

The staff moves because the hand moves.  The effect is the result of a simultaneous motion/change of a prior cause.  This motion/change of the cause must itself be the result of a simultaneous motion/change in another prior cause, and so on.  It is tempting to think that such essentially subordinated series of causes could stretch out infinitely, just as a temporally successive series of causes could.  But this is quite impossible, because we are talking about causes that are simultaneous in time to the effects.  There must be something driving the motion/change of the entire system.  As an example think of a long line of train cars, each connected to the one in front and behind.  This long line of cars is moving steadily along the track through Western Oklahoma.  Each car is transferring motion or energy to the other car in line and so on.  There must be at some point a locomotive for the train.  The locomotive is the initiator of the motion.  If the line of cars was infinitely long, there would be no first cause to originate the motion or energy being transferred simultaneously down the line of cars.  The point here is simple and logically obvious.  In an essentially subordinated series (series of simultaneous causes) the only cause really changing anything is the first cause in the series.

Aquinas then takes the argument to its logical conclusion.

Whenever the effects are the result of the simultaneous motion of prior causes that are themselves effects of prior moving causes, there must be something driving the motion of the system.  For example, a series of train cars which is transferring motion cannot be infinitely long because there would be no motion or energy to transfer without a first cause and source for the motion supposedly being transferred.  There must at some point be a locomotive for the train.  The point is simple and logically obvious.  In an essentially subordinated series (series of simultaneous causes) the only cause that is really changing anything is the first cause in the series.

Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other

This first mover must be fully actualized, i.e., unchanging, because anything that changes requires a cause for that change.  A “first cause” that itself was subject to change could not in fact be the first cause because the fact of it changing requires that something else outside the “first mover” cause the change.  Similarly, the first mover cannot be a physical, material being.  All physical, material beings are subject to motion/change.  The first mover is un-changing.  Therefore, the first mover cannot be a physical, material being.

Aquinas then ends the demonstration with a simple statement.

and this everyone understands to be God.

At this point, it is important to point out some important points about this first way.  Aquinas never says that everything changes.  He points out that change is an observed reality in the world.

He does not argue that the First Mover is the Creator of the Universe in this demonstration.  Nor does he argue that every change leads to the conclusion that a First Mover exists.  Nor does he argue in this demonstration that all the changes in the Universe demonstrate the existence of a First Mover.

He very specifically argues that an essentially subordinated series (series of simultaneous causes) demonstrates the existence of a First Mover.  His argument holds even if we can identify only one such case.

He never states the First Mover verifies or captures all the characteristics and beliefs about the Christian God contained in the Bible.  This demonstration did not have as its purpose to fully describe or prove the nature of God as contained in Christian belief.

To summarize the argument:

1. Things can change/move.
2. Every change is caused by the activity of something else - Nothing is the cause of its own process of change
3. If the activity of the cause is itself a change or motion then this per se effect must be caused by another prior, simultaneous cause.
4. In a chain of per se or essentially subordinated causes, there would be no last effect if something were not driving the whole chain as the first cause.  Since there must be a first initiator of change in essentially subordinated causes, the chain cannot be infinite.
5. Therefore there must be a First Mover that acts and causes change, but whose causing activity is not a change or motion.
6. This First Mover must be non-physical, non-changing but an actual and active cause of change/motion.

This First Mover is identified as God.